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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the role of family and gender in understanding the
disparities in human capital accumulation and corresponding disparities in labor market
outcomes.
The first chapter explores the relationship between workers’ wages and the gender
of their supervisor, conditioning on the occupational gender composition. It develops a
theoretical model suggesting that supervisors’ task assignment accuracy is affected
disparately in occupations of different gender types, leading to varying degrees of skill
mismatch among workers. This leads to average wage differences between workers with
female supervisors and those with male supervisors in occupations of different gender
types. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the empirical evidence suggests that
workers have better occupation-skill matches and higher average wages if they work with
female supervisors in predominantly female occupations, compared to those with male
supervisors; the opposite is true for workers in predominantly male occupations. Although
not significant at the early career stage, supervisor wage effects emerge as a worker’s career
develops. These findings emphasize the importance of supervisors’ task assignment
accuracy in workplace gender wage disparity, and underscore the necessity of integrating
minority managers to the “gendered” organizational contexts.
The second chapter examines the extent to which children enter occupations that are
different from their father’s occupation, but require similar skills, which we call task
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following. We distinguish between task followers and occupational followers, considering
the possibility that fathers can transfer task specific human capital either through
investments or genetic endowments to their children. We show that there is indeed
substantial task following, beyond occupational following and that task following is
associated with a wage premium of around 5% over otherwise identical workers employed
in a job with the same primary task. The wage premium is robust to controls for industry,
occupation categories and occupation characteristics. The premium is largest for followers
in non-routine cognitive jobs and college graduates.
Using a nationally representative sample, the third chapter sheds light on whether and
how cadre parents affect their offspring's labor market outcomes in China. On the one hand,
individuals with a cadre parent tend to have higher promotion rates over those without a
cadre parent. On the other hand, evidence does reveal a 10% cadre parent wage premium
at the mean level, which is not attributable to individual, parental and occupational
characteristics. Most of this premium can be explained by individual’s larger size of social
networks and closer relations with government officials and people from the public owned
enterprises. This suggests that social networks may be one of the mechanisms through
which cadre parents benefit the labor market outcomes of the next generation.
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CHAPTER 1
DIVERSITY IS MORE THAN NUMBERS: THE WAGE EFFECTS OF
SUPERVISOR-WORKER GENDER MATCH
1.1

Introduction
Does the gender of supervisor have any effect on the wages of the subordinate? The

answer to this question has important policy implication; specifically, can the workplace
gender wage gap be narrowed by imposing gender quotas1 in managerial positions (e.g.
Ridgeway, 1997; Hultin and Szulkin, 2003; Gorman, 2005; Hensvik, 2014).
However, the existing evidence on the direction and the significance of the
relationship is mixed. Although the literature has documented that female supervisors have
positive effects on female workers’ career outcomes (Hultin and Szulkin, 2003; Beckman
and Phillips, 2005; Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Flabbi, Macis, Moro and Schivardi, 2014;
Matsa and Miller, 2011) 2 , this pattern is challenged by other empirical findings. For
instance, some research finds that women earn higher wages when working with a male

1

Imposing gender quotas in top management groups has been a common practice in most European countries.
Countries such as Germany, France, Belgium, Iceland, and Italy impose mandatory quotas of female board
members. Countries like Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK adopt voluntary goals
for female representation (25%-40%). Currently, the US has no voluntary or mandatory quotas of female
board members. There is a discussion on whether it is necessary to adopt such quota in the US. (Source:
Margarethe Wiersema and Marie Louise Mors “What Board Directors Really Think of Gender Quotas”
Harvard Business Review, Nov. 14, 2016. https://hbr.org/2016/11/what-board-directors-really-think-ofgender-quotas).
2
Within this particular literature, some researchers use the proportion of female managers as exploratory
variable, indicating that greater representation of females in powerful positions would result in higher average
wages (Bell 2005; Hultin and Szulkin 1999; Kunze and Miller 2014; Maume and Ruppanner 2015; Tate and
Yang 2015) and better career outcomes for female employees (Bell, Smith, Smith, and Verner 2008; Gorman
2005; Matsa and Miller 2011). Another literature matches employees with their direct supervisors (Gorman
2005; Hensvik 2011; Lucifora and Vigani 2016). For a summary of literature, see Appendix A.
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supervisor

(Rothstein, 1997). Evidence also shows that female supervisors devaluate

women even more than do male supervisors (Heilman and Haynes, 2005; Mavin, 2006;
Maume, 2011): a pattern referred to as the “Queen-Bee Syndrome” (Staines, Tavris, and
Jayaratne, 1974; Cooper, 1997). In addition, some researchers argue that the gender of
supervisor simply has no effect on workers’ wages when workers’ unobserved
characteristics are controlled for (Fadlon, 2010; Penner and Toro-Tulla, 2010; Penner,
Toro-Tulla and Huffman, 2012; Bednar and Gicheva, 2014; Hensvik, 2014; Sicilian and
Grossberg, 2014; Marianne, Black, Jensen and Lleras-Muney, 2014). These mixed findings,
however, cannot be reconciled using the traditional taste-based discrimination or statistical
discrimination models, pointing to previously unexplored mechanisms. 3
Figure 1.1 presents the stylized facts from basic wage regressions that motivates this
research. 4 I divided workers in the NLSY97 core sample into two groups: workers with
female supervisor (blue solid line) and workers with male supervisor (red dashed line);
then I plot the residual wages along the spectrum of occupational share of female workers.
A pattern emerges: in predominantly female occupations, workers with female supervisors

3

According to the taste-based discrimination theory (Becker, 1957) supervisors favor same-gender workers
against opposite-gender ones. Statistical discrimination theory (Phelps, 1972; Aigner and Cain, 1977)
indicates that incomplete information and workers’ exogenous group differences contribute to employment
disparities, even if supervisors do not have subjective preferences. Following this, some theoretical models
suggest that supervisors are better informed of workers’ unobserved productivity when they share the same
cultural group (e.g., gender, race, and ethnicity) (Athey, Avery, and Zemsky, 2000, Altonji and Pierret, 1997,
Cornell and Welch,1996, Oettinger, 1996). Whichever theory applies, one may expect to observe empirically
that workers are more likely to receive higher wages when working with a same-gender supervisor than with
a supervisor of the opposite-gender. However, this pattern is not consistently observed in the aforementioned
empirical literature.
4
To obtain the residual wages, I regress one’s natural log of real hourly wages (in 2002’s dollar value) on a
set of demographic characteristics (race, highest years of education, experience, average percentile ranks of
ASVAB scores, employer tenure, occupational tenure as well as their polynomials) and a set of occupational
characteristics (average percentile ranks of O*NET occupation skill requirements, one-digit occupation
groups, one-digit industry groups). Details on variables and definition of match measures is given in Section
1.3. To construct the lines shown in the figure, I ran local polynomial regressions with residual wages on
occupational feminization rate for each group of workers.

2

earn higher wages than would be expected based on their demographic and occupational
characteristics, compared to workers with male supervisors; the opposite is true for workers
in predominantly male occupations. These suggest that supervisors’ wage effects may vary
conditioning on occupational gender composition. An explanation proposed by this
study is that male and female supervisors’ staffing decision is affected disparately in
occupations of different gender types. In occupations of different gender types, male and
female supervisors are attached disparately to the gendered culture and social networks
(Ridgeway and England 2007, 199-200; Gagliarducci and Paserman, 2015). For example,
female managers are more likely to be marginalized in predominantly male occupations;5
this excludes them from getting access to vital information on inner-organization resource
allocation. In predominantly female occupations, although men have benefited from their
minority status in terms of better career development (Bradley, 1993), the contradictions
between their masculinity and the feminized occupational sub-culture alienate them from
the female staff (Williams, 1993; Simpson, 2004). It follows that, in occupations populated
by opposite-gender workers, supervisors may themselves be the victims of information
distortion which will compromise their effectiveness in staffing decisions (Kanter, 1977,
Ely, 1995, Cohen and Huffman, 2007). This leads to the varying degrees of skill mismatch
among workers, conditioning on the occupational gender composition. Figure 1.2 6
illustrates this point by showing that workers have better match qualities with the female

5

The marginalization is mainly reflected as the exclusion from the “old boy networks”. The “old boy network”
is an informal male social system that stretches within and across organizations, and excludes all women
from membership (Lipman-Blumen, 1976). Kanter’s (1977) early work on ‘token’ women point to systems
of bias and discrimination whereby the dominant (male) group controls the group culture and through various
processes marginalizes and excludes the minority of women.
6
To obtain the figure, I ran local polynomial regressions with individual's total extent of skill mismatch
(normalized to have a standard deviation of 1) on occupational share of female workers for each group of
workers.

3

supervisors in female-predominant occupations, compared to their counterparts with male
supervisors; the opposite is true in male-predominant occupations. Greater skill mismatch
is associated with productivity loss (Guvenen, Kuruscu, Tanaka and Wiczer, 2016), which
leads to the stylized wage facts in Figure 1.1.
Motivated by these, this present study explores (1) the relationship between
workers’ wages and the gender of their supervisors, conditioning on occupational gender
composition, and (2) the underlying mechanism that leads to the observed wage patterns.
I extend the theoretical models in Phelps (1972), Cornell and Welch (1996) and Oettinger
(1996), assuming male and female supervisors are affected disparately by information
distortion in occupations comprising different gender types. This information distortion
affects how workers (with premarket “skill” attributes) are matched to occupations (defined
as their task and skill requirements). Supervisors’ information bias, skill mismatch and job
changes contribute to the observed supervisor wage effects that emerge as workers’
experience accumulates. Empirical results indicate that in male-predominant occupations,
a worker with a female supervisor has greater extent of skill mismatch and lower wages on
average, compared to their counterparts with a male supervisor; the opposite is true in
female-predominant occupations. Further, even if not apparent initially, wage disparities
emerge and enlarge as one’s career develops. The latter result reflects the fact that workers
receive a higher return to experience with female supervisors in female-predominant
occupations, and male supervisors in male-predominant occupations. The empirical
evidence also indicates that the observed wage pattern does not come from the genderbased skill sorting across occupations; and there is no evidence to suggest that the gender
of supervisor will affect workers’ wages through affecting workers’ promotion prospects.

4

The main lesson conveyed by this study is that gender diversity is not just
workforce composition but also interaction. Although gender quotas in managerial
positions do help to “break the glass ceilings,” the empirical evidence presented in this
study shows that supervisors’ task evaluation accuracy is substantially weakened in
occupations predominantly populated by opposite-gender workers, which impose negative
wage effects on workers in subordinate groups. Therefore, imposing a gender quota in
managerial positions is not an elixir to address workplace gender wage disparities. 7 Rather,
if female managers are not working coordinately with other male staff, the benefit of
diversity may be lost. In this sense, to achieve workplace gender equality, policies are also
needed to increase the information share and network building within and between firm
hierarchies, which characteristics help to create a diverse and inclusive workplace
environment.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 1.2 presents the theoretical model
and empirically testable predictions. Section 1.3 introduces the data and how the key
measurements are defined and constructed, followed by statistical descriptions of main
variables. Section 1.4 offers main empirical results. Section 1.5 presents robustness checks
and discusses other possible mechanisms. Section 1.6 summarizes the results and discusses
related implications.
1.2

Theoretical Model
This section presents a theoretical model in supportive of the main argument in this

study. The theoretical model in this study extends the models in Phelps (1972), Oettinger
(1996) and Cornell and Welch (1996) by considering the gender of supervisor, information

7

The finding in this present study also resonates with the findings in Marianne et al (2014), which suggests
that the “quotas of female managers” has no statistically significant effect on gender wage gap in Norway.

5

distortion conditioning on occupational gender composition, as well as workers’ skill
mismatch. This section only presents how the empirically testable implications are derived
from the theoretical model. For details of proofs, please refer to the Appendix-B.
Assume a group of risk-neutral workers, each belonging to one gender type i
(male/female, i = 𝑓, 𝑚 ). Each worker is endowed with a set of skill attainments
unobservable to supervisors. I assume that workers’ skill attainments are denoted as A ,
and the distribution is identical to males and females.
Based on the share of female workers (p), occupations can be divided into two types
(k = f, m). Occupations with larger share of female workers (p > 0.5) are predominantly
female occupations, and otherwise, predominantly male occupations (p < 0.5). Each
occupation has a set of skill requirements R . R ~𝑁(𝑅, 𝜎 ) In each occupation, there are
two types of risk neutral supervisors, male and female(𝑗 = 𝑓, 𝑚). The share of female
supervisors in occupation 𝑘 is denoted as 𝜋 .
This model changes the assumption in usual statistical discrimination models (e.g.
Phelps 1972, Cornell and Welch 1996) in the following two ways.
(1) Assumptions about skill mismatch and productivity. This model assumes that
workers’ productivity 𝑢 in a filled vacancy depends on how their skills are matched to the
occupational requirements. This builds upon a long list of literature suggesting that workerjob match plays an important role in determining workers’ productivity (Jovanovic, 1979;
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Kalleberg 2008; Lise and Postel-Vinay, 2015; Guvenen
et al. 2016). Skill mismatch (either over-match or under-match) generates negative

6

productivity8. In usual statistical discrimination models, expected productivities depend
only on workers’ skill attainments, which ignores the importance of match-specific 9
productivity.
𝑢 = f(A , R ) = 𝑅 − |𝑅 − 𝐴 |,
where 𝑄 = |𝑅 − 𝐴 | denotes the extent of skill mismatch. The productivity is maximized
when 𝑄 = 0 .The productivity 𝑢

can be normalized to follow a normal

distribution 𝑢 ~𝑁(𝑚, 𝜂 ), which is identical for men and women.
(2) Assumptions about supervisors’ information noise. To evaluate workers’
productivity 𝑢 , in a job vacancy (a.k.a., worker-job match), supervisors draw a set of
information 𝐼 , about workers’ skill attainments10 and occupational requirements11.
𝐼, =𝑢 , +𝜖, ,
where

𝜖 , denotes the information noise for supervisor of gender j , who evaluates

productivity for worker of gender i in occupation k. In this model, supervisors are assumed
to draw more accurate information in occupations with larger share of same-gender

8

It is easy to understand that when workers’ skill attainments fall short of occupational requirements, their
productivity will be lower than the productivity if they were well-matched. What needs to be explained here
is that over-qualification may also lower workers’ productivity. Literature in industrial psychology indicates
that overqualified workers tend to be more dissatisfied with their jobs, exhibit more absenteeism, turnover
and even sabotage behavior (Sheppard and Herrick, 1972; Quinn and Shepard, 1974; Quinn and Mandilovitch,
1975; Chevalier, 2003, Green and McIntosh, 2007, and Green and Zhu, 2010), which lead to reduced work
effort, inflicting additional cost of production beyond the cost of workers’ compensation. Tsang and Levin
(1985) develop a model that formally establishes the negative relationship between over-qualification and
productivity (Tsang, 1984; Tsang and Levin, 1985; Guvenen et al. 2016).
9
In Oettinger (1996), workers’ productivity is also assumed to be specific to different worker-supervisor
matches. In this study, “match-specific” refers to how workers’ skill attainments are matched to occupational
requirements.
10
Signals of workers’ skill attainments have been well discussed in the literature of statistical discrimination.
It involves results from interviews, pre-hiring tests on various skills, reference letters, etc.
11
Information related to occupational requirements refers to information about firms’ organizational
structure, as well as any important and relevant conditions in the marketplace and other external factors that
must be considered in the staffing decision.
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workers 12 . That is, 𝜖 ~𝑁(0, 𝑝 𝜎 ) , 𝜖 ~𝑁(0, (1 − 𝑝) 𝜎 ). Also, for simplicity, it is
assumed that 𝜖 , and 𝜖 , are independent variables.
1.2.1 Without job changes
For simplicity, I first consider a situation in which there’s no job changes, and in
section 2.2, I consider a situation with job changes. In this world, each worker lives for
three stages:
Stage 0: A worker of gender i observes the gender composition of supervisors
π and workers p in each occupation. Based on this information, he/she applies for one
type of occupation.
Stage 1: Supervisors draw information about workers’ skill attainments and
occupational requirements. Workers are recruited based on their expected productivity, and
they are paid based on the “starting wage offers” 13. Following Oettinger (1996), workers’
starting-wage offer is a weighted sum of the expected productivity and the true productivity:
𝑤,

,

= 𝜃𝑢 , + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢 , ,

where 𝜃 denotes the weight on workers’ expected productivity14. When 𝜃 = 0, workers
receive a piece-rate wage, which depends solely on the realized productivity.

12

The assumption of 𝜖 , is different from those in usual statistical discrimination models. For example, in
Phelps (1972) and Oettinger (1996), employers receive less accurate signal of skill attainments for workers
from the minority groups than workers from the majority groups. In Cornell and Welch (1996) and Fadlon
(2010), the information is noisier for workers matched to supervisors in different culture groups. In our study,
however, the source of information bias comes from the gender interaction across firms’ hierarchies.
13
In stage 1, all workers are new to the supervisors. The wage offers they receive are starting wage offers.
The starting wage is a weighted sum of workers’ expected productivity and the true productivity. In stage 2,
only workers who move to new supervisors are offered the starting wage contracts.
14
For simplicity and without loss of generality, 𝜃 is assumed to be the same for male and female workers
across stages 1 and 2. However, this model also allows 𝜃 to be different between men and women, and in
different time periods.

8

Stage 2: Each worker’s true productivity in stage 1’s occupation 𝑢 ,

is revealed

,

to supervisors, and to themselves. Workers’ wages in this stage are determined by their
true productivity.
𝑤,

,

=𝑢,

(1) Workers’ expected productivity and skill mismatch
At the recruiting stage, the expected productivity for type 𝑖 workers with
supervisor j in occupation k is:
𝑢, ≡𝐸 𝑢, 𝐼,
Where for male supervisor, 𝜌

= 𝜌

𝐼 , + [1 − 𝜌

]𝑚,

; for female supervisors, 𝜌 =

=

(

.

)

It is easy to show that in female predominant occupations, female supervisors put
higher weights on workers’ true productivity and male supervisors put higher weights on
workers’ signal; in male-predominant occupations, male supervisors put higher weights on
workers’ true productivity and female supervisors put higher weights on workers’ signal.
Recall that to maximize workers’ productivity, supervisors only hire workers
whose skill attainments are perfectly matched to occupational requirements ( 𝑄 ,
𝑅

,

,

=

− 𝐴 = 0 ). Therefore, worker 𝑖 will receive wage offers from supervisor j in

occupations with requirements 𝑅

,

=𝑢,

,

.

For workers with skill attainments A , the average extent of skill mismatch if
working with a female supervisor is: 𝐸(𝑄 , ) = 1 − (𝜌 ) |𝑚 − A |. The average extent
of skill mismatch if working with a male supervisor is: 𝐸(𝑄 , ) = [1 − (𝜌 ) ]|𝑚 − A |.
Proposition 1:

9

For each worker, the extent of skill mismatch depends on gender of supervisor and
occupational gender composition: 1) In female-predominant occupations, a worker has
smaller extent of skill mismatch if matched to a female supervisor, compared to the
situation if matched to a male supervisor. 2) In male-predominant occupations, a worker
has smaller extent of skill mismatch if matched to a male supervisor, compared to the
situation if matched to a female supervisor.
(2) Workers’ wages in stage 1
When workers’ true productivities are not revealed, the average wages for female
workers with female supervisors in predominantly female occupation is 𝐸 𝑤
𝜃𝑢

, ,

+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

, ,

𝐸 𝑤

, ,

,𝐸 𝑤

=

= 𝑚. The average wages for female workers with male supervisors

in predominantly female occupation is: 𝐸 𝑤
we have 𝐸 𝑤

, ,

, ,

=𝐸 𝑤

, ,

=𝐸 𝑤

, ,

, ,

, ,

= θ𝑢

, ,

. Similarly,

we can

and 𝐸 𝑤

=𝐸 𝑤

, ,

+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑢
obtain
, ,

, ,

= 𝑚. Thus,

that E 𝑤

, ,

=

. Even though workers’

skill attainments are matched disparately to occupations at the entry of labor market, skill
mismatch does not immediately translate to the average wage differences.
Proposition 2:
Initially, the gender of supervisors has no effects on workers’ wages, regardless of
occupational gender composition.
(3) Workers’ wages in stage 2
In stage 2, workers’ true productivities are revealed. Since there’s no job changes
at this stage, workers’ wages are determined by the true productivity, which depends on
their skill match qualities.

10

𝑤,

,

=𝑢, =𝑅 −𝑄,

Thus, for female workers with skill attainment A, working with male supervisors
in predominantly female occupation generates an average stage-2 wage as: 𝐸 𝑤
𝐸(𝑅 − 𝑄

,

) = 𝑅 − 1 − (𝜌 ) |𝑚 − 𝐴| , but working with female supervisors in

predominantly female occupation generates an average stage-2 wage as: 𝑤
𝐸(𝑅 − 𝑄

,

=

, ,

) = 𝑅 − 1 − (𝜌 ) |𝑚 − 𝐴|. It is easy to show that 𝐸 𝑤

Similarly, 𝐸 𝑤

, ,

>𝐸 𝑤

, ,

,𝐸 𝑤

<𝐸 𝑤

, ,

, ,

,𝐸 𝑤

, ,

, ,

<𝐸 𝑤

<𝐸 𝑤

=

, ,

, ,

, ,

.

. As

workers’ true productivities reveal, wage losses associated with skill-mismatch leads to
different wage earnings for supervisor-worker gender match in different occupations.
Proposition 3:
As workers’ occupational tenure accumulates, in female-predominant occupations,
workers with female supervisors earn higher wages on average compared to workers with
male supervisors; in male-predominant occupations, workers with female supervisors earn
lower wages on average compared to workers with male supervisors.
1.2.2 With job changes
The model in section 2.1 assumes that once hired, workers stick to the same
supervisor in a same occupation. However, this assumption is somewhat counter intuitive:
workers with greater skill mismatch would suffer greater wage declines if they choose to
stay with the old supervisors. Intuitively, they tend to change jobs and take advantage of
new supervisors’ information bias to avoid wage decline in stage 2. Thus, in this section, I
consider job changes in stage 2.
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Assume each worker receives a wage offer from a new supervisor 15 in stage 2.
Workers make the decision of whether to stay or to move. Stayers are paid based on their
true productivity, but movers are paid based on the “starting wage offer” issued by the new
supervisor (see wage schedules below). Table 1.1 summarizes cases of mobility decisions.
𝑤,
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=
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,

,
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(1) Inter-period wage gains conditioning on mobility decisions
The inter-period wage gains conditioning on the decision of “stay” is: ∆w , =
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0]. The inter-period wage gains conditioning on workers’ mobility decision summarized
in Table 1.2, based on which two propositions can be derived.
Proposition 4:
15

For simplicity, we assume workers do not receive offers from occupations of different gender type at stage
2. For instance, female workers working in predominantly female occupations only receives new wage offers
from supervisors in predominantly female occupations. This assumption is justified since we believe that the
occupational requirements differ a lot between the predominantly female occupations and predominantly
male occupations. Workers’ skill attainments have been acquired at the time they decide to apply for either
male or female occupations. Therefore, it is unlikely that a worker changes occupation type at later career
stages. However, different task assignments imply that the true productivity may vary for the same worker
in different stages u , , ≠ u , , .

12

(i) Stayers with the female supervisors obtain lower inter-period wage gains
compared to stayers with the male supervisors, in occupations with larger proportion of
female workers. (ii) Stayers with the female supervisors obtain higher inter-period wage
gains compared to stayers with the male supervisors, in occupations with larger proportion
of male workers.
Proposition 5:
In female-predominant occupations, movers with female supervisors in both stages
earn the highest inter-period wage gains; movers with male supervisors in both stages earn
the lowest inter-period wage gains; other movers earn inter-period wage gains in between.
The opposite applies to male-predominant occupations.
(2) Conditional expectation of the stage-2 wage and returns to experience
For stayers, the conditional expectation of second period wage for stayers is:
𝜋 𝐸 𝑢,

𝑢,

,
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𝐸 𝜃𝑢 ,

,

.

−𝑢,

,

> 0 + (1 − 𝜋 )𝐸 𝑢 ,
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+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑢 ,

,

of
𝑢,

.

the
−𝑢,

,

,

𝑢,

−𝑢,

.

second-period
<0

,

wage

> 0 . For movers, the
for

movers

is:

. The average second-period wages

conditioning on workers’ mobility are summarized in Table 1.3. From stage 1 to stage 2,
workers gain 1 years of labor market experience.

Proposition 6 characterizes the

differences in return to experience.
Proposition 6:
(i) Stayers’ return to one-year experience generates higher return than movers’ oneyear experience. (ii) In female-predominant occupations, workers with female supervisors
have higher return to experience, compared to their counterparts with male supervisors. In
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male predominant occupations, workers with female supervisors have lower return to
experience, compared to their counterparts with male supervisors.
(3) Unconditional Wage Expectation in Stage 2.
The stage-2 unconditional wage expectations are summarized in Table 1.4.
Supervisors’ wage effects emerge and enlarge as workers’ experience accumulates.
Proposition 7:
As experience accumulates, (i) in female-predominant occupations, workers with
female supervisors receive higher wages on average, compared to workers with male
supervisors; (ii) in male-predominant occupations, workers with female supervisors
receive lower wages on average, compared to workers with male supervisors.
Since workers receive the same average wages at stage 1, therefore, their life-time expected
wages depend on wage expectations at stage 2. Compared to their counterparts with
opposite gender supervisors, workers with female supervisors earn higher expected lifetime earnings in predominantly female, but they earn less in predominantly male
occupations.
1.2.4 Summary of empirically testable predictions:
The above theoretical predictions lead to the following empirically testable
implications.
1. In predominantly female occupations, a worker has smaller extent of skill mismatch
with a female supervisor, compared to their counterparts with a male supervisor. In
predominantly male occupations, a worker has greater extent of skill mismatch with
a female supervisor, compared to their counterparts with a male supervisor.
2. Initially, there is no wage effects associated with supervisors-worker gender match.
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3. As workers’ experience accumulates, workers with same-gender supervisors earn
higher wages on average compared to workers with opposite-gender supervisors,
in occupation with larger share of same-gender workers.
4. In predominantly female occupations, stayers with female supervisors have lower
average wage growth rates, compared to movers with female supervisors; movers
with the male supervisors have lower wage growth rate, compared to movers with
female supervisors. The opposite is true in predominantly male occupations.
5. In predominantly female occupations, workers with female supervisors have higher
return to experience. In predominantly male occupations, workers with female
supervisors have lower return to experience.
1.3

Data

1.3.1 NLSY97 data
The empirical tests are based on the data from National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 97 (NLSY97)16, which contains a nationally representative panel of youth who were
aged 12-16 as of December 1996. The NLSY97 data has the following major advantages.
First, it covers workers in early career stages, which allows us to examine how the
supervisors’ wage effects emerge and enlarge, starting from the labor market entry. Second,
the data contains detailed information on workers’ working history, which enables us to
construct accurate measures on workers’ job tenure, occupation tenure and labor market
experience17. Third, the data includes information about the gender of a workers’ direct

16

Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort,
1997-2011 (rounds 1-15). Produced by the National Opinion Research Center, the University of Chicago and
distributed by the Center for Human Resource Research, The Ohio State University. Columbus, OH: 2013.
17
In this study, job tenure is defined as number of years that individual respondent works for the same
employer. The same employer is identified in NLSY 97 data with the same “employer unique id”. Occupation
tenure is defined as number of years that individual respondent works in a typical 3-digit occ1990dd
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supervisor from 1997-2008, with which I can match respondents’ gender with the gender
of their direct supervisors. In addition, NLSY data allows me to control for cognitive and
non-cognitive skills of workers across several dimensions, using the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test scores and the Big 5 Personality Scale. These
measures are unavailable in other panel data sets of a similar nature. These advantages
make NLSY97 data suitable for this study.
As our research interest focuses only on workers’ wage earnings, respondents who
are self-employed, serving in military, as well as over-sampled Hispanic or Latino and
Black people are excluded. I also exclude those who work full-time in the first year they
were observed, since it is impossible to identify the point of labor market entry for these
people. Table 1.5 presents the sample selection process for this study.
The wage is measured using workers’ real hourly wage payment in 2002’s dollar
value. Samples with missing information on hourly payment, or reporting hourly wages
less than $1 or over $100018 are excluded. After excluded those with missing information
on any of the variables used in the analysis, our main sample comprises 33150 person-year
observations over 11 waves of the survey (1997-2008).
The NLSY97’s occupations are coded by the 2002 Census Occupational
Classification (COC)19. I mapped these occupational codes using a unified code so that I

occupation. Cumulative labor market experience is defined as cumulative number of years that individual
respondents spent working full-time, starting from the labor market entry.
18
The hourly payment information in NLSY97 also contains entry errors, to avoid this potential problem, we
trace individual workers’ wage growth rate. Those having a more than 400% wage growth rate in one year
followed by an 80% wage decline the next year are identified as “mistyped”. In the sample, there’re 16
observations’ wage information are labeled as “mistyped”. These wage observations are adjusted to match
the record in other years.
19
NLSY97Attachment
1:
Census
Industrial
&
Occupational
Classification
Codes
(https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy97/other-documentation/codebook-supplement/attachment-1census-industrial), time of visiting Aug. 1st , 2016
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can merge the O*NET occupational knowledge, skills and ability (KSA) requirements and
female employment rates obtained from ACS data to our sample. The 2002 COC were first
converted to 2000 COC (occ2000) and then mapped to the 3-digit occupation code
occ1990dd

20

suggested in Dorn (2009), using the crosswalks downloaded from

http://www.ddorn.net/data.htm on Sep.24, 2015 21 . After mapping, the occupations are
divided into 6 aggregate occupation groups
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using do-file downloaded from

http://www.ddorn.net/data.htm on Sep.24, 2015, as are used in Autor and Dorn (2013).
Table 1.6 provides basic descriptive statistics for the NLSY97 sample.
1.3.2 Constructing skill mismatch measurement
This study defines an individual workers’ skill mismatch as the discrepancies
between one’s premarket skill attainments and the requirements of the occupations in
which they are employed. 23 This skill mismatch measurement goes beyond one’s

20

According to Dorn (2009), the “occ1990dd” system provides a new unified occupational category system
containing 330 occupation codes, which helps constructing “a balanced panel of occupations covering the
1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses and the 2005 ACS” (Dorn 2009, p122). Although there’s another cross work
provided by Meyer and Osborne (2005) with 386 “occ1990” occupation codes, one limitation with this code
system is, according to Dorn (2009, p122), “the occupation panel is unbalanced”. “occ1990dd” system is also
widely used in recent literature on skill and occupations, such as Autor (2010), Autor and Dorn (2013), Shim
and Yang (2016) etc. In view of these, this study chooses “occ1990dd” code system to obtain a timeconsistent and balanced occupation panel.
21
When mapping the 2000 COC code to occ1990dd, 11 occupations are not worked by NLSY97 respondents,
21 occupations cannot be mapped to occ1990dd, and 2 occupations are miscoded. Depending on Dorn (2009),
we assigned the approximate 1990dd code to the un-mapped 21 Census 2000 occupations to minimize
observation loss. Details of the code-matching are available upon request.
22
The 6 aggregated occupation groups are: (1) Managers/professionals/ technicians/finance/public safety
occupations; (2) administrative support and retail sales occupations; (3) low-skill services; (4) precision
production and craft occupations; (5) machine operators, assemblers and inspectors; (6)
transportation/construction/mechanics/mining/agricultural occupations.
23
A review of literature suggests that measurements of skill mismatch are constructed in following ways,
each bares some disadvantages. First, dummies indicating self-reported mismatch (Hersch 1991), which may
be biased when respondents have misperception of their situations of skill mismatch. Second, mismatch
measurements defined as deviations from the average (or median) level of education (or skill intensity) in
one’s occupation (Verdugo and Verdugo 1989). This measurement is usually used in the absence of
occupational skill requirement data, which provides more objective indicators than self-reported mismatch
dummies. However, this measurement tends to be biased since the average educational/skill level in a
particular occupation may be affected by the distribution of skill mismatch in this occupation. For instance,
the average level of education (skill attainment) in an occupation may be biased upwards if most of workers
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educational attainments and reveal more in-depth views on the extent and consequences of
multi-dimensional skill mismatch even for individuals with the same level of education.
In linking the skill supply side (viz. workers’ endowments) with the demand side
(viz. occupational requirements), I exploit the tools developed by the Career Exploration
Program. The ASVAB Career Exploration Program is administered by the Department of
Defense (DoD) with a view to helping ASVAB participants identify and explore suitable
career possibilities in the private, public, or military sectors. About 80 percent of the
NLSY97 sample participated in the computer adaptive test of the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery (CAT-ASVAB).24
Four categories of skills are included in this study: Mathematical, Verbal,
Science/Technological/Mechanical (STM) and Social skills. For the first three skills, I
construct composite measures using percentile ranks on selected ASVAB subtests 25 .
Specifically, for verbal skills I use the percentile scores on Word Knowledge and
Paragraph Comprehension, for mathematical skills the scores on Arithmetic Reasoning
and Mathematical Knowledge, and for STM skills the scores on General Science,
Mechanical Comprehension, and Electronics Information. 26 Next, using the weights

in this occupation are over-qualified. The opposite situation applies to the case when most of workers in this
occupation are under-matched.
24
For details of the administration of the CAT-ASVAB tests, the reader is referred to the NLSY97 web pages:
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy97/topical-guide/education/administration-cat-asvab-0.
25
CAT-ASVAB test measures respondents’ knowledge and skills through the following subtests: Arithmetic
Reasoning, Assembling Objects, Auto Information, Coding Speed, Electronics Information, General Science,
Mathematics Knowledge, Mechanical Comprehension, Numerical Operations, Paragraph Comprehension,
Shop Information, Word Knowledge. For the explanation of each sub-tests and the score calculation, please
refer to the Appendix 10 of NLSY97: Administration and Scoring of the CAT-ASVAB
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy97/other-documentation/codebook-supplement/appendix-10cat-asvab-scores.
26
This approach is similar to that used by Guvenen et al. (2016) other than for the inclusion of STM scores.
There is no consensus in the literature on construction of the ability measures, and even though almost all
studies utilize ASVAB test scores, they select different ability dimensions or different subtests for
measurement of these dimensions. We have checked the robustness of our results to variation in
measurements, such as the exclusion of STM skills by Guvenen et al. (2016) and the restriction of ASVAB
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provided by the NLS,27 I create a comparable composite skills measure from these subtest
scores for each NLSY respondent. I then standardize these skill percentile ranks to be
between 0 and 1. For the social skill measurement, I use two questions on Extroversion and
two questions on Conscientiousness in the Big 5 Personality Scale to construct a social
skill rank, following Deming (2017a). I download the standardized measurements from
Deming’s (2017b) data file, and then converted the scores to percentile ranks for NLSY97
respondents.
In this study, each occupation is considered as a combination of KSAs (Knowledge,
Skills and Ability) it requires. For each of the ASVAB math/verbal and STM test scores,
there is a corresponding occupational task in O*NET database which utilizes that KSA. 28
This mapping is provided in Appendix C. After merging the O*NET KSA extracts to
NLSY97, I calculated the percentile rank scores of occupational math/verbal/STM)
requirements. For each of the three-dimension ASVAB categories, I created an O*NET
analog by averaging the corresponding descriptors in each category. After that, I convert
the three-dimension O*NET occupational requirements into percentile ranks among
occupations.
The extent of skill-mismatch is measured as the absolute value of the differences
between one’s percentile-rank scores of skill endowments and the percentile-rank scores
of corresponding occupational requirements. Specifically, let 𝐴 represents individual i’s
percentile-rank-scores in ASVAB test for skill endowment j (j denotes mathematics, verbal,

measured abilities to cognitive and manual by Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) who also analyze mismatch by
separate ability dimensions as opposed the use of an aggregate measure.
27
We thank the NLS program staff for their help in this connection.
28
I use the 2007 version of the O*NET database, after Hirsh and Manzella (2015). We are indebted to Barry
Hirsch for kindly providing these data.
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as well as STM and social skills). Recall that 𝐴 does not vary by year or an individual’s
occupation. Let 𝑅

denotes an individual i’s O*NET occupational requirements for skill

j, in occupation k, in year y. Individuals’ ASVAB scores are mapped to O*NET
occupational requirements based on the method developed by the Department of Defense
(DOD) (see Appendix C for details). The degree of skill mismatch for individual i for skill
j, in year y and occupation k is:
Q

= |𝐴 − 𝑅

|.

The lower the value of Q, the better the skill is matched. I scaled each dimension
of Q to have a standard deviation of 1.
Table 1.7 provides a description of mismatch measures used in this study, by the
gender of supervisor and occupational gender composition. Statistics show that workers
have greater amount of skill mismatch in predominantly female occupations, compared to
their counterparts in predominantly male occupations. Moreover, for most of the cases in
our sample, workers have less extent of skill mismatch with same-gender supervisors in
occupations populated by same-gender workers.
1.3.3 Measurement of jobs’ gender-type: occupational share of female workers
The occupational gender composition (FEM) is measured using the ratio of female
workers to the sum of total workers in an occ1990dd occupation. The FEM measurements
are generated from the American Community Survey (ACS) data from 1997-2008 29. The
occupations are obtained in a simplified version of occ1990 codes used by IPUMS and I
use the crosswalk provided by IPUMs to map them into the standard occ1990 codes. Then

29

The data is downloaded from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS): Steven Ruggles, Katie
Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, and Matthew Sobek. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:
Version 6.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015. http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0.
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I use Dorn’s crosswalk to obtain the FEM in each occ1990dd occupations and merge them
to the main NLSY97 data set.
1.4

Empirical Results

1.4.1 Supervisors’ wage effects conditioning on occupational gender composition
The first motivation figure indicates that workers with female supervisors earn
higher wages than they would be expected in predominantly female occupations and lower
wages in predominantly male occupations, compared to their counterparts with male
supervisors. This section tests whether this stylized pattern holds empirically. The
estimation results are reported in Tables 1.8A and 1.8B.
Sicilian and Grossberg (2014)’s research argues that no significant wage effects are
associated with the gender of supervisor when controlling for occupational gender
composition and individual worker’s fixed effect. To be comparable to this previous study,
Table 1.8A reports the estimation results when the “female supervisor” dummy is not
interacted with occupational gender compositions. When no other controls are added in
the OLS regression (Columns labeled [1]), female supervisor is associated with a 6% wage
loss on average. The magnitude of wage loss reduces to 5% when individuals’ demographic
variables are controlled for in the “standard” specifications, and to 1% when occupational
gender compositions and occupation-related variables are controlled for in the “full”
specification. When fixed effect models are used to control for workers’ unobserved
characteristics, this negative wage effect shrinks to less than 1% in the “standard”
specification, and it becomes insignificant in the “full” specification. This pattern is
consistent with the pattern suggested by Sicilian and Grossberg (2014).
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However, a different picture unfolds when the supervisor’s wage effects are
examined conditioning on occupational gender composition. The estimations are reported
in Table 1.8B. When no other controls are added, the OLS regression suggests that workers
with female supervisors in predominantly male occupations are associated with certain
wage loss, but the magnitude of wage loss reduces as the proportion of female workers
increases. In predominantly female occupations, workers with female supervisors earn
higher wages on average compared to their counterparts with male supervisors. This pattern
remains consistent when the full set of control variables are included and workers’ fixed
effect model are used. Based on the fixed effect model estimation with the full set of control
variables. In occupations where female workers only accounts for 5% of the workforce, a
worker with female supervisors suffers 4% wage penalty on average, compared to their
counterparts with male supervisors. In occupations where female workers accounts for 95%
of the labor force, a worker with female supervisors earn 3.6 % wage premium on average,
compared to their counterparts with male supervisors. In occupations with even share of
male and female workers, there’s no significant wage difference between workers with
female supervisors and those with male ones.
Considering that the gender of supervisor may affect workers’ match quality in
current job, and better match quality may be correlated to a longer tenure with
employer/occupation and longer labor market experience. Therefore, the tenure and
experience measurements may be endogenous. Following Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and
Guvenen et al. (2016), I instrument individuals’ employer/ occupational tenure/total
experience with their relative position in the tenure hierarchy with a given employer or
occupation, controlling for the possibility of multiple spells of employment with the same
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employer or in the same occupation. 30 The IV-fixed effect estimations are reported in Table
1.8B, and there’s no significant changes in terms of sign or magnitude.
Previous research emphasizes that only men benefit from their same-gender
supervisor, and the occupational share of female workers fully explains the negative
association between women’s wages and female supervisors. Different from these
arguments, the empirical findings in this section suggests that working with female
supervisors is associated with wage premium in predominantly female occupations, but it
is associated with wage loss in predominantly male occupations. Why is this? Possible
mechanisms are explored empirically in the sections that follow.
1.4.2 Explaining the supervisors’ wage effects
(1) The gender of supervisors and occupational skill mismatch
One of the possible mechanisms, as is proposed in the theoretical model, is that
female supervisors are less affected by information distortion while recruiting workers in
predominantly female occupations, leading to better skill match qualities for their
subordinates (Figure 1.2). This section presents tests on whether this patter holds
empirically. The results are reported in Tables 1.9 and 1.10.
Table 1.9 checks how supervisors’ gender affects the size of skill mismatch for their
subordinates, conditioning on occupational gender composition. The dependent variable is

30

𝐼𝑉
=𝑇
−𝑇
and 𝐼𝑉 = 𝑇 − 𝑇 , where 𝑇
is the average duration for individual 𝑖 with
the same employer 𝑘 and 𝑇 is the average duration for individual 𝑖 with the same occupation j. 𝑇
=
∑ 𝑇
, where 𝑇 is the total number of spells that an individual is observed with the same employer.
, ,

𝑇 =
𝑇 , , , where 𝑁 is the total number of spells that an individual is observed with the same
occupation j. Total experience is also instrumented in the same way, with an instrument 𝐼𝑉 = 𝑇 − 𝑇 ,
where 𝑇 is the average duration that individual 𝑖 stays in the labor market 𝑇 = ∑ 𝑇
, where 𝑆
∑

, ,

is the total number of spells that an individual is observed to be in the labor market.
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the standardized total amount of mismatch. We see that, workers with female supervisors
are 5%-6% standard deviation more mismatched in all-male occupations compared to their
counterparts with male supervisors, but they are 5-6% standard deviation less mismatched
in all-female occupations. This pattern is highly in-line with our theoretical predictions.
The IV-fixed effect estimations are reported in Columns (3), and there’s no significant
changes in terms of sign or magnitude.
As are presented in Table 1.10, workers with female supervisors are more likely to
be both overqualified and under-qualified in predominantly male occupations, but they are
less likely to be overqualified or under-qualified in predominantly female occupations.
Summing up the findings in Tables 1.9 and 1.10, empirical evidence generally
supports the theoretical predictions: female supervisors lead to better skill match for their
subordinates in occupations with greater proportion of female workers; workers with
female supervisors suffer from greater extent of skill mismatch in predominantly male
occupations. Differences in skill match qualities affect workers’ true productivities, which
then contributes to the observed wage patterns.
(2) Supervisors’ wage effects along workers’ career path
As is indicated in our theoretical model, if disparities in skill match quality is the
underlying mechanism that leads to the observed supervisors’ wage effects, we may expect
to see the following predictions hold empirically: (1) the gender of supervisors have no
significant wage effects at early career stages, but the effects emerge as workers’
experience accumulates. (2) A worker’s return to job mobility decision and to experience
is affected by the gender of his/her supervisor and occupational gender composition. This
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section examines these predictions by exploring supervisors’ wage effects along workers’
career paths.
First, we explore how the supervisors’ wage effects develop as workers' labor
market experience accumulates. Table 1.11 reports the estimated coefficients of "female
supervisor" and its interaction term with FEM for a subsample 31 of individual with "less
than 3 year" "3-6 years" "more than 6 years" of labor market experience. The coefficients
are estimated using the fixed-effect model and IV-fixed effect model including the full set
of control variables. The estimated female supervisors’ wage effects and its interaction
term with FEM is statistically insignificant for workers at the immediate entry into the
labor market. These findings generally support one of the theoretical predictions: “At the
entry of labor market, there should be no wage gap on average between individuals with
same-gender supervisor and those with opposite-gender supervisor, ceteris paribus.”
As workers’ experience accumulates, the supervisors’ wage effects emerge and
remain the same pattern as are described above. The magnitude of supervisors’ wage
effects also increases as workers’ experience accumulates. This generally support the
theoretical prediction: “As workers’ labor market experience accumulates, the average
wage gap may emerge for workers with same-gender supervisor and those with oppositegender supervisor, ceteris paribus.”
Table 1.12 reports the estimation on differences in return to job-motilities. The
signs of coefficients are consistent with theoretical predictions: compared to stayers with
female supervisors in predominantly female occupations, movers with female supervisors

31

Following Oettinger (1996), the subsample contains individuals who have 3 consecutive years of full-time
working experience in the main job. The subsample also rejects individuals who work full-time in the first
year in which they were observed.
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in these occupations have higher wage growth rate; in predominantly female occupations,
compared to movers with male supervisors, movers with female supervisors have higher
wage growth rate. In predominantly male occupations, however, movers with female
supervisors receive the lowest wage growth rate.
Table 1.13 examines the last group of theoretical predictions on the return to labor
market experience. The return to one-year labor market experience is higher for those with
female supervisors in predominantly female occupations, but it is lower for those with
female supervisors in predominantly male occupations. This is consistent with the
theoretical prediction that “women with male supervisors have higher return to
occupational tenure than women with female supervisors in occupations with smaller
proportion of female workers”.
1.5

Robustness Checks: other mechanisms?
In addition to the information bias, two other mechanisms may also lead to the

afore-mentioned supervisors’ wage effects, which will be discussed respectively in this
section.
1.5.1 Whether the same-gender supervisor wage effects are due to skill sorting?
It is likely that the observed wage effects capture the gender skill sorting across
occupations, rather than the bias in information. For instance, it is possible that female
supervisors are more capable in predominantly female occupations, so that they are
associated with positions with higher skill requirements. Therefore, higher average wages
for workers with female supervisors in predominantly female occupations may be
attributable to higher occupational skill requirements. The same argument may apply to
male supervisors in predominantly male occupations. If these arguments hold, then
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empirically, we may expect to see the following two patterns: (i) In predominantly female
occupations, those with positions of higher skill requirements are more likely to work with
female supervisors; in predominantly male occupations, those with positions of higher skill
requirements are more likely to work with male supervisors. (ii) Initially, the stylized wage
effects should be prominent. However, as are shown above, workers just enter the labor
market, supervisors’ wage effects are not prominent, which does not support pattern (i). As
are shown in Table 1.14, the probability of working with a female supervisor does not
significantly associated with the occupational skill requirements in predominantly female
occupations; while in predominantly male occupations, female supervisors are even
associated with positions of higher skill requirements. This indicates that pattern (ii) is also
not supported empirically. Therefore, the argument that the observed same-gender
supervisor wage effects are due to skill sorting is not supported by empirical evidence.
1.5.2 Whether the gender of supervisor affects workers’ wages via influencing
workers’ promotion prospect?
The empirical results show that the supervisors’ wage effects are not prominent at
the entry of labor market, and it emerges and enlarges as workers’ experience accumulates.
This pattern could also be observed if the gender of supervisor affects subordinates’
promotion prospects.
Literature suggests that compared to men, women are less likely to engage in
competitive activities such as bargain, and are more likely to be at a bargaining
disadvantage (Babcock and Laschever, 2003; Croson and Greezy, 2009). It follows that
female supervisors are associated with lower promotion probability for subordinates,
because they fail to bargain sufficiently or successfully for their subordinates, especially in
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predominantly male occupations. This, in turn, may lead to lower average wages for those
working with female supervisors in predominantly male occupations. Similar story may
hold for male supervisors in predominantly female occupations.
NLSY97 data contains information on “whether the respondent has been promoted
since the last date of interview” in the year 2006-2008, based on which the above argument
can be tested. Table 1.15 presents the results for the logit regression estimates on the effects
of having a female supervisor on promotion probability. No evidence is found to support
the argument that the gender of supervisor is associated with workers’ promotion prospect.
This indicates that the gender of supervisor does not affect workers’ wages via influencing
workers’ promotion prospect.
1.6

Conclusions
The study starts with a screening-bias model, which allows information distortion

to interact with supervisor-worker gender match, as well as occupational gender
composition. In addition, workers’ productivity is assumed to be maximized when their
skills are well matched to task requirements. Based on these assumptions, information
distortion leads to different extent of skill mismatch for workers with different supervisors
in different occupations. When workers are paid according to the expected productivities
at the entry of an occupation, there’s no average wage gap between those with same-gender
supervisors and those with opposite-gender supervisors. However, when workers’ true
productivities are revealed as their experience accumulates, job changes lead to different
returns to experience. In this way, the average wage gaps between workers with samegender supervisors and workers with opposite-gender supervisors emerge and enlarge,
which vary in occupations of different gender types.
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Consistent with theoretical predictions, empirically, workers benefit from the
female supervisors, in terms of better match and higher average wages, in predominantly
female occupations. These effects remain robust when individual and time fixed effects are
controlled for. Supervisors’ wage effects are insignificant for workers initially, and it
emerges as a worker’s career develops. In addition, evidence supports that workers with
same-gender supervisors receive lower return to experience in occupations with larger
share of opposite-gender workers, compared to their counterparts with opposite-gender
supervisors.
This study contributes to current literature in three ways. First, the empirical
evidence, to some extent, reconciles the mixed empirical results. “Women benefit women”
is more likely to be associated with predominantly female occupation, and “Queen Bee
Syndrome” predominantly male occupation. Similar effects are found to be associated with
male supervisors. As the supervisor’s wage effects go in the opposite directions in
predominantly male and female occupations, the opposite effects may cancel out in pooled
sample regression, leading to insignificant effects at the mean level (Sicilian and Grossberg,
2014; Hultqvist, 2015). Studies restricted to specific occupations or industries (i.e. large
grocery retailers in Penner, Toro-Tulla and Huffman, 2012; athletic teams in Bednar and
Gicheva, 2014; financial occupations on Wall Street in Roth, 2004; law firms in Beckman
and Phillips, 2005; small businesses in Penner and Toro-Tulla, 2010) only provide partial
depictions of this effect under certain circumstances.
Second, this study reveals that supervisors’ task assignment accuracy not only exert
one-time wage effects on the subordinates, but also affects subordinates’ decision on job
mobility, the return to experience, as well as their earnings in later career stages. Previous
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research suggests that men and women receive different returns to tenure because of the
differences in human capital investment, in anticipated career interruptions, and in training
and promotion opportunities (O'Neill and Polachek, 1993; Hersch and Reagan, 1997;
Munasinghe and Reif, 2008). This study adds to this literature from a new perspective,
revealing how gender difference in returns to experience can be influenced by the
interaction between supervisor’s gender and occupational gender composition.
Finally, this study sheds light on whether the pervasive workplace gender wage
disparity will be attenuated through promoting women’s access to powerful positions. On
one hand, this study suggests that the same-gender supervisor does affect workers’ wages,
but the effects comes more from information distortion than discrimination. As are
suggested in this paper, the managerial staff, either men or women, in occupations
dominated by opposite-gender workers may themselves be the victims of information
distortion and compromise their effectiveness in implementing staffing policies. Thus,
imposing gender quotas in managerial positions, per se, is not sufficient to narrow the
workplace gender wage gap. A possible policy implication is, minority managerial staffs
should not be isolated, while instead policies (e.g. increasing gender diversities in all ranks
of organization, promoting information flow within organizations) are needed to enhance
their integration in “gendered” workplace contexts.
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Table 1.1 Cases of Job Mobility at The Second Stage
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Table 1.2 Summary of Inter-Period Wage Gains Conditioning on Mobility Decision
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Table 1.3 Average Second-period Wage Conditioning on Mobility Decision
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Table 1.4 Unconditional Wage Expectations for Workers in Stage 2
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Table 1.5 NLSY97 Sample Construction
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Table 1.6 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
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Table 1.7 The Size of Mismatch, by Gender of Supervisor and Occupational Gender Composition
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Table 1.8A: Supervisors’ Wage Effects, Not Conditioning on Occupational Gender Composition
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Table 1.8 B: Supervisors’ Wage Effects, Conditioning on Occupational Gender Composition
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Table 1.9 The Determinants of Skill Mismatch: Gender of Supervisor and Occupational Gender Composition
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Table 1.10 The Possibilities of being Over/Under-qualified: Gender of Supervisor and
Occupational Gender Composition

Female Supervisor
Female Supervisor* FEM
FEM
FEM-Squared
Observations
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Female Supervisor
Female Supervisor* FEM
FEM
FEM-Squared
Observations

(1) Logit
(2) FE-Logit
(A) Probabilities of being Over-qualifie d
Coeffiicients
Log Odds
Coeffiicients
Log Odds
0.3441
1.41
0.5958
1.81
[0.1424]*
[0.4045]
-0.7198
0.49
-0.7667
0.46
[0.2275]**
[0.6363]
-1.0099
0.36
-1.565
0.21
[0.5497]+
[1.5379]
1.4692
4.35
2.2342
9.34
[0.4940]**
[1.3767]
33150
33150
15628
15628
(B) Probabilities of be ing Under-qualified
Coeffiicients
Log Odds
Coeffiicients
Log Odds
0.2866
1.33
0.8644
2.37
[0.1348]*
[0.3743]*
-0.746
0.47
-1.2587
0.28
[0.2170]**
[0.6240]*
1.9789
7.23
4.9828
145.88
[0.4835]**
[1.4418]**
-1.1115
3.29
-2.9081
0.055
[0.4386]*
[1.3270]*
33150
33150
12505
12505

Notes: The dependent variable in Panel (A) is a dummy that equals 1 when a worker is more than
one standard deviation more endowed than required. The dependent variable in Panel (B) is a dummy
that equals 1 when a worker is more than one standard deviation less endowed than required. The
estimations are made based on the "Full" specification as explained in Table 9 . Robust standard errors
are reported in brackets. **, *, + indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.

Table 1.11 Same-Gender Supervisor Wage Effects along the Career Path
Fixed Effect Model
Labor Market Experience (Years)
0-3
Female Supervisor

3-6

6+

IV-Fixed Effect Model
Labor Market Experience (Years)
0-3

3-6

6+
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-0.0156
-0.0397
-0.0577
0.0083
-0.0364
-0.0632
[0.0315] [0.0166]*
[0.0182]**
[0.0384] [0.0168]* [0.0185]**
Female Supervisor* FEM
0.0222
0.0786
0.1028
-0.0183
0.0682
0.1085
[0.0480] [0.0257]**
[0.0282]**
[0.0590] [0.0260]** [0.0287]**
FEM
-0.0983
-0.1339
-0.0712
-0.0728
-0.1286
-0.07
[0.0408]* [0.0212]**
[0.0240]**
[0.0497] [0.0214]** [0.0244]**
Observations
5453
14121
13573
5453
14121
13573
Notes: The dependent variable is log hourly wage in 2002's dollar value. Estimations are based on the full set of
controls. In IV-fixed effect models, coefficients are estimated using the IV-fixed effect model with full specification,
where employer tenure, occupational tenure, and total experience, as well as their quadratic forms and interaction terms
are instrumented. Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. **, *, + indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and
0.1 levels, respectively.

Table 1.12 Same-Gender Supervisor and Returns to Job Mobility and Continuation
All
Female Supervisor
Female Supervisor*FEM
Female Supervisor*Movers
Female Supervisor*Movers *FEM
Movers *FEM
Movers
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FEM
Observation

FE
IV-FE
0.0002
0
[0.0208]
[0.0210]
-0.0289
-0.0292
[0.0323]
[0.0325]
-0.0736
-0.0724
[0.0276]** [0.0278]**
0.1724
0.1702
[0.0424]** [0.0427]**
-0.1424
-0.1364
[0.0234]** [0.0236]**
0.129
-0.0118
[0.0151]**
[0.0206]
-0.0119
-0.0111
[0.0233]
[0.0235]
28865
28865

Female
FE
IV-FE
0.0187
0.0193
[0.0326]
[0.0329]
-0.055
-0.0541
[0.0470]
[0.0474]
-0.105
-0.1085
[0.0445]* [0.0448]*
0.204
0.2063
[0.0638]** [0.0643]**
-0.1713
-0.1696
[0.0466]** [0.0470]**
0.1738
0.0358
[0.0331]**
[0.0382]
0.0076
0.0069
[0.0379]
[0.0382]
14692
14692

Male
FE
IV-FE
-0.0058
-0.005
[0.0302]
[0.0304]
0.0013
-0.0066
[0.0541]
[0.0546]
-0.0586
-0.0588
[0.0421]
[0.0424]
0.1268
0.1341
[0.0745]+ [0.0751]+
-0.1915
-0.1833
[0.0341]** [0.0344]**
0.1296
-0.0089
[0.0193]**
[0.0279]
0.0059
0.0088
[0.0337]
[0.0340]
14173
14173

Notes: The dependent variable is individuals' annual growth rate of real hourly wages. Estimations are based on the full set of controls. In IV-fixed effect models,
coefficients are estimated using the IV-fixed effect model with full specification, where employer tenure, occupational tenure, and total experience, as well as their
quadratic forms and interaction terms are instrumented. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. **, *, + indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels,
respectively.

Table 1.13 Gender of Supervisor and Returns to Experience
FE
Female Supervisor

Female Supervisor * FEM
Female Supervisor * Experience
Female Supervisor * Experience* FEM
Experience* FEM

0.0671

IV-FE
0.033

[0.0210]**

[0.0468]

-0.0985
[0.0323]**
-0.0214
[0.0033]**
0.0344
[0.0050]**

-0.051
[0.0766]
-0.0153
[0.0081]+
0.0253
[0.0133]+

-0.0138
[0.0028]**

FEM

-0.0284
[0.0203]

Experience

0.0028

Observations

[0.0053]
33150

-0.0131
[0.0048]**
-0.0273
[0.0297]
0.0179
[0.0058]**
33150

Notes: The dependent variable is log hourly wage in 2002's dollar value. Estimations are based on the
full set of controls. In IV-fixed effect models, coefficients are estimated using the IV-fixed effect model
with full specification, where employer tenure, occupational tenure, and total experience, as well as their
quadratic forms and interaction terms are instrumented. Clustered standard errors are reported in
brackets. **, *, + indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Table 1.14 Occupational Skill Requirements and The Probability of Having a Female Supervisor
Predominantly Female
Occupation
Coefficients
Percentile ranks of
Occupational
Requirements

-0.3308

Mixed Occupation

Predominantly Male
Occupation

Log-Odds Coefficients Log-Odds Coefficients Log-Odds
0.72

-0.0796

0.92

1.5643

4.78
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[0.3621]
[0.4269]
[0.7393]*
Number of Observations
7815
5289
1970
Notes: The estimations are made based on the fixed effect logit model with full set of control variables.
Predominantly male occupations are occupations where female workers account for less than 33%;
predominantly male occupations are occupations where female workers account for more than 67%;
mixed occupations are occupations where female workers account for 33%-67%. Clustered standard
errors are reported in brackets. **, *, + indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels,
respectively.

Table 1.15 Female Supervisor and Promotion Probability
(1) Logit
Coefficient
0.0206
[0.1625]
Female Supervisor*FEM
-0.1384
[0.2643]
FEM
0.3023
[0.2029]
Observations
10948
Female Supervisor

Log-Odds
1.02
0.87
1.35

(2) FE-Logit
Coefficient
Log-Odds
-0.3479
0.70
[0.2927]
0.1601
1.17
[0.4730]
-0.8002
0.45
[0.4267]+
2911

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if an individual have been promoted since the
last date of interview. This variable is only available from 2006-2008. Estimations are made based on
logit regression. The clustered standard errors are reported in . **, *, + denote statistical significance
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Figure 1.1 Workers with female(male) supervisors earn higher than would
be predicted in predominantly female(male) occupations
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Figure 1.2 Worker-job match quality varies conditioning on gender of
supervisor and occupational gender composition
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CHAPTER 2
FOLLOWING (NOT QUITE) IN YOUR FATHER’S FOOTSTEPS: TASK
FOLLOWERS AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES
2.1

Introduction
There

exists

an

extensive

literature

documenting

the

prevalence

of

intergenerational occupational following. That is children have a greater-than-chance
likelihood of working in the same occupation as their father, particularly among sons
(Rogoff, 1953; Blau and Duncan, 1967).
Subsequent work has focused on occupational following within a specific
occupation and found that occupation following is common and that there is a wage
premium associated with it. Indeed, this phenomenon has been found in truly a wide variety
of professions including agriculture, proprietors, doctors, surgeons, politicians, public
sector workers, race car drivers, lawyers and other professional occupations (Laband and
Lentz, 1983; Lentz and Laband, 1989; Lentz and Laband, 1990; Groothuis and Groothuis,
2007; Pinchot, et. al, 2008; Scoppa, 2009; Feinstein, 2010; Aina and Nicoletti, 2014).While
most of the work on this has focused on sons, women are increasingly more likely to work
in their father’s occupation, beyond what is predicted by the fact that women are now more
likely to work in any male dominated occupation than in previous generations (Hellerstein
and Morrill, 2011).
Laband and Lentz (1983) present an economic framework based on human capital
acquisition to explain occupational following and its apparent wage premium. In their
49

model children acquire more occupation specific human capital in their father’s occupation
due to differences in the marginal cost of acquiring occupation specific human capital. In
addition to making them more likely to choose this occupation, the occupation specific
human capital is unobserved by researchers, thus providing an explanation for the apparent
wage premium associated with occupation followers. Similarly, children may inherit
unobserved skills that make them better at their father’s occupation than others.
Empirically, a number of papers have attempted to find evidence for the mechanism
at work among occupational followers. Laband and Lentz (1992) find evidence of
occupation specific human capital transfers among lawyers and that recipients of these
transfers earn more than lawyers that do not receive such transfers. Lentz and Laband (1990)
provide further evidence of transfers of human capital among entrepreneurs. While, Knoll
et al (2013) offer evidence that occupational following is not due to genetic similarity, but
rather is caused by upbringing.
Other work has focused on the possibility of nepotism or family networks as the
source of occupational following. Lentz and Laband (1989) document a 14% increase in
the likelihood of being accepted to medical school among the children of doctors that
cannot be explained. Scoppa (2009) finds evidence that in Italy the children of public
sector employees have a substantial advantage in gaining employment in public sector jobs
themselves. Aina and Nicoletti (2014), also using Italian data, suggest that nepotism and
networks are common across professions requiring a degree and some sort of licensing
exam.
Finally, an alternative explanation is that children are occupation followers because
of intergenerational correlation, either transferred or inherited, of preferences. If children
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have similar preferences over occupation characteristics then it would hardly be surprising
to find they are more likely to be employed in the same occupations, although this does not
in itself explain any wage premium associated with occupation following. There is some
evidence that preferences might play a role. Altonji and Dunn (2000) show substantial
correlation in wages and working hours within families that are primarily driven by
correlations in preferences. Escriche (2007) demonstrates this on one dimension: the
likelihood of children to work in gender mixed occupations based on the gender-mix of
their parents’ occupations. While Ham et al (2009) find that the intergenerational
transmission of personality matters for occupation choice. Although, it is not entirely clear
if personality reflects a difference in preferences or a difference in skill.
In this paper, we explore a similar type of skill transfer from fathers to children:
task specific skills. In particular, there is the possibility that in addition to general human
capital and occupation specific human capital, fathers can also transfer task-specific human
capital to their children. By task specific human capital, we mean skills that are important
for the father’s occupation, but might also have a return in other occupations that require
similar skills. For example, the child of an engineer might receive some human capital that
is also relevant to being a computer programmer. We document that children are more
likely to be employed in an occupation where the primary task is the same as that of their
father, even when the children are not in the same occupation as the father. Further, we
find that task following is associated with a wage premium, again independent of
occupational following. That is to say, individuals employed in the same task as their father,
earn more than otherwise observationally equivalent workers employed in that same task.
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Empirically, we examine whether children enter into occupations where the
dominant task, defined as the primary task of the occupation in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT), is the same as the primary task in their father’s occupation and
are not in the same occupation as their father, where occupation is defined by the
occ1990dd code. We call these individuals who are not working in the same occupation,
but employed in an occupation with the same primary task as task followers. Thus, while
occupational followers are also working in the same task as their fathers, they are generally
excluded from what we call task followers.
Our work is closely related to a pair of recent papers written by Okumura and Usui.
In the first (Okumura and Usui, 2014), they look at the social skills of parents and the social
skills of their children using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).
To proxy for parents’ social skills, which are not measured, they use the skills needed in
the father’s occupation. They find a large transmission of social skills from parents to their
children and substantial returns to children from their parents’ social skills. That is they see
better social skills in the children of fathers who are employed in an occupation that
requires higher social skills. This implies that on at least one dimension fathers are able to
transfer a skill associated with their occupation.
The second paper (Okumura and Usui, 2015) develops a model where fathers can
invest in a multidimensional set of skills for their children. Empirically, they use National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1979 data to investigate the intergenerational
transmission of occupational skills and racial disparities in their transmission. To do this
they calculate the correlation (cosine of the angle) between the vector of skills required in
the father’s occupation to the vector of skills required by the son’s occupation. They find
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a greater than random intergenerational skill correlation and that the correlation is greater
for whites than for blacks. Implying that task following is common, but more so for whites.
White sons also earn a significant wage premium from working in occupations requiring
similar skills, while black sons face a wage penalty. Further, the degree of skill correlation
between fathers and sons is larger for highly educated whites, but not for blacks. They
conclude this intergenerational skill transmission explains a significant portion of the
black-white wage gap.
There are a few notable differences in their approach to ours. Most significantly,
while they compute the correlation across a breadth of specific skills and individual tasks
performed in a current job, we follow the approach taken in Autor, Levy and Murnane
(2003) and Autor and Acemoglu (2010), and group these skills/tasks into 6 more general
groups. DOT has about 40 task components and ONET has about 400, this generalization
enables us first have a consistent measure throughout the data period. Moreover, as one
can imagine many of these individual tasks are highly correlated and require the same type
of transferable skills. Working with these groups also enables us to derive intuition on how
task following has been affected by structural changes in the labor market and is more
directly comparable to other literature using task measures. Among these tasks in our
analysis we further focus only on the primary task of a job and its share of the overall in
job in some settings 32 . We also distinguish between task followers and occupational
followers. Given the previous literature on occupational following, task following (and its
premium) could be just a byproduct of occupational followers also being task followers.
Another notable difference is that we include women in our analyses as well.

32

While our preferred approach is to focus on the primary task, our main results are robust to calculating the
task following measure as a distance between all tasks as in Okumara and Usui (2016).
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We contribute to the understanding of intergenerational occupation transmission in
the following ways. First, there does exist substantial task following that is distinct from
occupational followers. Second, there exists a 5% wage premium associated with task
following. This premium is independent of the premium associated with occupation
followers. For comparison, the premium associated with occupational following is
estimated to be 5-7%. We find, contrary to Okumara and Usui (2016), no difference in the
task or occupational following premium by race. Third, for college educated women there
exists a wage premium associated with task and occupation following, but not so for noncollege graduates. For men the premium for task following is confined to college graduates,
while the premium from occupational following is the same for both groups. The size of
this premium does not appear to be changing over time for men.
Our results have implications for intergenerational income persistence as well as
gender wage differences. First, if the return to transmitting task specific human capital is
restricted to certain occupations or skills, then, fathers employed in those occupations have
the potential to transfer more human capital to their children. This could amplify
intergenerational income persistence. Second, if daughters are unlikely to benefit from
certain task specific human capital transfers, then the nature of human capital investment
in daughters will be different than investment in sons for fathers employed in those
occupations. This could feed greater gender wage differentials, although this might be
countered by increased investment in general human capital for daughters.
The paper is organized as follows: the following section describes the theoretical
framework, section 1.3 describes the data, section 1.4 details the methodology, section 1.5
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presents our main results, section 1.6 provides discussion of the implications and section
1.7 concludes.
2.2

Theoretical framework: Model of Task Following
We formulize the idea of task following in a simple wage and occupation choice

model. Using the model, we will derive the conditions for task following and the wage
premium associated with task following. This model will enable us to illustrate the
relationship between the estimated and the real premium, which differ due to selection in
the occupation (task) choice process. We will then discuss the testable implications of the
model.
Suppose there are two generations of workers (fathers and their offspring) and two
types of tasks each worker performs, routine tasks and non-routine tasks (R and N). A
father can pass on task-specific human capital to his offspring if they choose the same task
as him. Thus, an offspring’s total human capital at a task includes a task-specific ability
level and these task specific skills inherited from their fathers if they task follow.33
2.2.1 Wage Determination
If there is any task specific human capital transfer between generations, wages for
the second-generation workers are determined as a function of not only their personal
characteristics and chosen task but also their fathers’ task. Assuming all else equal, task
dependent components of wage is given as in Eq. (1)
Eq. (1)

𝑤 = 𝛾 [𝐼(𝑖 = 𝑗)𝐻 +𝜖 ]

where i and j are father’s and the child’s tasks respectively, either routine (R) or non-routine
(NR) for both. In this equation 𝛾 is the relative price of non-routine to routine task, where
33

While we treat the intergenerational transfer of task-specific human capital as exogenous, the qualitative
results are similar in a set-up where father’s choose how much human capital to transfer.
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price of routine tasks is normalized to one and if non-routine tasks are more valued than
routine tasks in the labor market then γ > 1. The indicator function 𝐼(𝑖 = 𝑗) is for task
following and Hi captures the human capital transmitted by the father if someone task
follows. Each individual has a unobserved draw of ability in each task, 𝜖 . We assume
these unobserved task endowments are distributed as standard normal with a correlation of
𝜌 . So possible wages for the offspring of non-routine workers are either 𝛾𝐻 + 𝛾𝜖
(labelled as 𝑤

) if they task follow or 𝜖 (labelled as 𝑤

) if they do not. For the

offsprings of routine task holding fathers’ wages are either 𝐻 + 𝜖 or 𝛾𝜖 (or 𝑤
𝑤

and

, respectively). We are suppressing the individual indicator subscripts here and this

point on for simplicity.
2.2.2 Occupation Choice
A second-generation worker follows task only if 𝑤
routine task father (and become an N-task follower) or if 𝑤

>𝑤
>𝑤

when he has a nonwhen his father’s

tasks is routine (R-task follower). That is, for the N-task followers we must have:
𝛾𝐻 + 𝛾𝜖 > 𝜖 .
Rearranging this will give us:
𝜖 − 𝛾𝜖 < 𝛾𝐻
where

~N

,
𝑃

𝛾
𝛾𝜌

𝛾𝜌
. Thus, probability of N-task following is:
1

= Pr[𝜖 − 𝛾𝜖 < 𝛾𝐻 ] =Pr
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<

=Φ

where Φ(∙) is normal cdf, v = 𝜖 − 𝛾𝜖 and 𝜎 = [1 + 𝛾 − 2𝜌𝛾] . Probability of RTask following can be similarly derived. 34 Notice, that due to the presence of task specific
human capital, workers will choose to task follow even in some cases where they are
otherwise are more productive in the other task.
2.2.3 Wage premium to task following
The estimated wage premium to task following will be the difference between task
followers’ expected wages and the expected wages of the non-task followers in the same
task. For the N-task followers this premium is:
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝐸(𝑤

) − 𝐸(𝑤

)

= 𝛾𝐻 + E[𝛾𝜖 |𝑣 < 𝛾𝐻 ] − 𝐸[𝛾𝜖 |𝑣 < 𝐻 ]
𝑣
𝛾𝐻
<
𝜎
𝜎

= 𝛾𝐻 + 𝛾𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜖 , 𝑣)𝐸

𝑣
−𝐻
<
𝜎
𝜎

−𝐸

= 𝛾𝐻 + 𝛾𝜌 (−𝜆(𝛿 ) − (−𝜆(𝛿 )),
where 𝜌

is the correlation between 𝑣 and 𝜖 , 𝛿 =

,𝛿 =
[

and 𝜆(∙)=

(∙)
(∙)

]

is the inverse Mill’s ratio. Given above assumptions 𝜌

,
[

]

=
[

]

and the premium can be rewritten as
[𝜆(𝛿 ) − 𝜆(𝛿 )].

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝛾𝐻 + 𝛾
[

]

Note that the premium has two components. The first is simply the value of the
inherited human capital, which we call the true premium from task following. The second
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𝑃

= Pr[𝛾𝜖 − 𝜖 < 𝐻 ] == Pr

<

where u=−𝑣 = 𝛾𝜖 − 𝜖 and 𝜎 = [1 + 𝛾 −

= Φ

2𝜌𝛾] .
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is the part of the measured premium that is due to selection. Specifically, this is due to
individuals choosing to task-follow even though they received a relatively better draw in
the other task. We will refer to this part of the premium as b . The premium for routine
task following is similarly derived.35
This model has several testable implications that are of interest to us. Our main
focus is the existence and magnitude of the wage premium and its determinants. Notice
first the obvious implication that there will be no premium to task following if individuals
did not inherit any task specific human capital. That is, if 𝐻 = 0, and 𝐻 = 0, then 𝛿 =
𝛿 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 0.
Second, the larger the 𝛿 , the larger the probability for an individual to be an Ntask follower.

>0,

< 0,

> 0, and

> 0. A rise in γ, the price of N-

task relative to R-task, has two effects on the measured wage premium to N-Task following:
on one hand, it increases the unconditional wage premium 𝛾𝐻 ; on the other hand, it
changes the premium rising from self-selection, b . Since γ > 1, 0 < ρ < 1, 𝛿 > 𝛿 we
have [𝜆(𝛿 ) − 𝜆(𝛿 )] < 0. Thus b < 0 and

< 0. That is an increase in γ decreases

the estimated wage premium for the N-task followers .

Moreover, as a result

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 <𝛾𝐻 . That is, the estimated wage premium from a Mincerian setup with OLS
would be the lower bound of the wage premium for task followers over non-task followers
in N-task.

35

Wage premium to R-task following is : Premium = 𝐸(𝑤 ) − E(𝑤

) = 𝐻 + E[𝜖 |𝑢 < 𝐻 ] −

[𝜆(−𝛿 ) − 𝜆(−𝛿 )] where 𝛿 and 𝛿 are defined as above and 𝜌

𝐸[𝜖 |𝑢 < −𝛾𝐻 ] = 𝐻 +
[

]

is the correlation between u and 𝜖 .
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For the R-task followers an increase in γ will not change the unconditional wage
premium 𝐻 , but it affects the measured premium through selection effect. Specifically,
for b =

[𝜆(−𝛿 ) − 𝜆(−𝛿 )] we can show that b > 0 and
[

> 0 if 𝛾 > .

]

An increase in γ increases the estimated wage premium for the R-task followers.
2.3

Data
For this analysis we use the core cohort of the General Social Survey (GSS) data

from 1972-2010. This is a nationally representative cross-sectional sample. We restrict our
sample to individuals between the ages of 18-65, with a valid census occupational code
(occ70, occ80), no missing information and who are employed by someone other than
themselves or the military. 36 This leaves us with 12882 observations over 28 cohorts from
1972-2010.
Occupational codes are not recorded consistently across each wave of the survey.
Between 1972 and 1987, the occupations are coded according to both the 1970 census
codes. Between 1988 and 2010, however, jobs are exclusively identified using the 1980
census codes to capture the new and emerging occupations.
We mapped these occupational codes so as to be able to study the full extent of the
occupation data panel available to us. Specifically, we used the crosswalks provided by
David Dorn (2009) and Autor and Dorn (2013), giving 3-digit occupation codes—or
1990dd—that can serve as a link between occupation codes of 1970, 1990, and 2000 census.
We first use their crosswalk linking 1970 and 1990dd and then the crosswalk linking 2000

36

Employed is defined as having a working status is “Working full time”, “Working part-time”, and “With
a job, but not at work because of temp illness, vacation and strikes”. We do not consider individuals whose
working status are “Unemployed or laid off”, “Retired”, “In School”, and “Keeping house”. We also excluded
individuals who are 1) current armed-forces, 2) former armed forces with no valid occupational codes, 3)
self-employed.
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and 1990dd, so that all occupations in our sample will be measured by 1990dd codes in a
consistent fashion.37
After successfully converting the occupational codes to 1990dd, we merge in
characteristics of jobs using skills and task measures embedded in each job. The measures
were developed by a series of studies on skills of jobs by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003),
Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011), making effort to define
the “task content” for different occupations. Where a task is a unit of work activity that can
produce either goods or service or both, and workers are regarded as allocating their skills
on different tasks required on different jobs. 38
Occupations are then categorized based on the composition of tasks. 39 For our
purposes we will use six categories defining the task associated with a job: non-routine

37

These occupational codes were downloaded from David Dorn’s website http://www.cemfi.es
/~dorn/data.htm on Sep.24, 2015. In GSS data, occupational codes are not recorded consistently across each
wave of the survey. Between 1972 and 1987, the occupations are coded according to both the 1970 census
codes. Between 1988 and 2010, however, jobs are exclusively identified using the 1980 census codes to
capture the new and emerging occupations. In the mapping of occ1970 to occ1990dd, two occupations that
could not be directly mapped. One of them is occupation “280” from occ1970 “sales and salesmen clerk”
(884 respondents in the sample). We assign occ1990dd code 274 to this occupation, guided by the occupation
definitions contained in Meyer and Osborne (2005) and in Dorn (2009). Another occupation with occ70
coded as 590 in GSS data, containing 165 observations in fathers’ data and 191 observations in individuals’
data. Since the code cannot be found in census 1970 codes, (https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/97occup.shtml),
it is left un-coded in occ1990dd. All the occ80 codes are matched to occ1990dd expect for current and former
arm-forces. Details of the procedure are available upon request.
38
The Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) is originally used by Autor, Levy and
Murnane (2003) to impute to workers the task measures associated with their occupations, and then it is also
verified and merged with Occupational Information Network (O* Net), Census and CPS occupational
categories.
39
There are 4 occupations have no task measurements in Autors’ data, and they are: 1) occ1990dd=227,
occ80=227: “Air traffic Controllers and Airfield Operations Specialists”. 2) Occ1990dd=303, occ1980=303:
“First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Office and Administrative Support”. 3) Occ1990dd=503, occ1980=503:
“First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Mechanics, Installers, and Repairers”. 4) Occ1990dd=803,
occ1980=803: “Supervisors, Transportation and Material Moving Workers”. Given that these occupations
accounts for a small proportion in sample (less than 100 observations), we do not include these observations
in the analysis.
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cognitive, analytical, non-routine cognitive interpersonal, routine cognitive, routine
manual, non-routine manual physical and non-routine manual interpersonal. 40
2.4

Methodology
In order to document the nature of task following we will first provide a descriptive

look at the dominant task in an individual’s occupation conditional on only their father’s
occupations’ dominant task. In these tabulations we will try to capture if individuals are
disproportionally more likely to be in occupations where they perform the same primary
tasks as their father. Our main test of this is whether the likelihood an individual is in task
i conditional on their father being in task i is higher than the likelihood an individual is in
task i conditional on their father being in a task other than task i. We do this for all
individuals and for the subsample that does not include individuals that are in the same
occupation as their father (at a three-digit occupation code).
Then we will estimate log wage equations in a Mincerian setting to capture the
wage returns to task following. In these equations in addition to standard controls we will
specifically control for whether the individuals are in the same task or the same occupation
as their fathers. For all of our wage regressions, we define task-followers as individuals
that are in the same task, but different occupations (defined at a three-digit level).
The following is the baseline log wage equation we estimate:
log(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 ) = 𝛼 𝑋 + 𝛽 (𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘 ) + 𝛽 (𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ) + 𝜀
where real wage is calculated in 1982 dollars and 𝑋 is a vector of individual level controls
for the respondent’s (s) highest years of schooling, potential experience (age – 6 – years of
schooling), experience-squared, marital status, race, gender, union-status, number of

40

See definitions for skills in the Appendix D.
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children, and their fathers' highest years of schooling, mothers' highest years of schooling,
cohort and region indicators as well as dummy controls for occupation groups and
industries for the specific (at three digit level) occupation they are employed in. We also
include gender controls and gender interactions with the task and occupation following
dummies in the baseline model. We sometimes estimate this baseline model separately by
gender to allow for more flexible slope estimates. We might expect the returns to task
following to be different by education status or across general occupational groups. In
order to allow differential returns by education, in an extension to the basic model, we
include an indicator for being a college graduate and following one’s father’s task.
2.5

Main Results
Our main results are organized as follows. First we present the evidence that task

following is a real phenomenon and is distinct from occupational following. Next we
present the basic results on the wage premium associated with task following and finally
we explore how this varies by the interaction of education and gender.
2.5.1 Task Followers
To describe the nature and degree of task following, we first calculate the matrix of
child task and father task combinations, including those who work in the same occupation
as their father. The results are presented in Table 2.1.
Each cell represents the fraction of all children with that own task/father task
combination. For example, the first cell (upper left) shows that in 2.5 percent of all
observations the child is in a non-routine, cognitive analytical task and has a father that
was also in a non-routine cognitive analytical task. The diagonal of Table 2.1 is the fraction
of all offspring that are task followers by each dominant task. The total row reports the
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fraction of fathers that are employed in each dominant task, while the total column reports
the fraction of children by their dominant task. This serves to highlight the differences
across generations in the share of jobs with each dominant task, partly due to changes in
overall job composition in the economy and partly due to the inclusion of women. While
only 4.5% of fathers are employed in a routine cognitive task, 16.5% of the offspring are
employed in an occupation with that dominant task. Non-routine manual physical tasks, on
the hand, make up 37.1% of the father’s task, while only 16.1% of the children. These
changes in composition muddy the degree of task following among children. For example,
while the fraction of children whose father was employed in a non-routine manual physical
task, that follow their father is just 20.8% (7.7/37.1), among the children that are employed
in a non-routine manual physical task, nearly 50% (7.7/16.1) are task followers.
In Table 2.2 we report the fraction of offspring in each task conditional on the
dominant task in their father’s occupation (each cell in table 1 divided by the total row).
The diagonal of Table 2.2 is the fraction of children that are task followers (including
occupational followers) by each task. The next to last column reports the fraction of
offspring in each task, conditional on not being a task follower. The last column reports
the results of a t-test that the diagonal is significantly different from the next to last column.
The most pronounced task following is in the non-routine cognitive analytical task,
where the fraction of offspring, conditional on that also being the father’s task, is nearly
twice as large as the unconditional fraction (26% vs. 13.5%). For each task, the dominant
task of the father is either the most common or second most common outcome. Further the
likelihood an offspring enters a given task, conditional on their father being in that task, is
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higher than the likelihood an individual enters that task conditional on the father not being
in that task and this difference is statistically significant for every task.
Of course, this could just be a reflection of the fact that occupation followers are
also employed in the same task as their fathers. To demonstrate that task following exists
and is distinct from occupation following, we report the same calculation as in Table 2.2
excluding the occupation followers.
Again, task following is common and the likelihood an offspring enters a task
conditional on their father being in that task is higher than the likelihood an offspring enters
that task conditional on their father not being employed in that task. This difference is
statistically significant for all tasks except routine cognitive (Table 2.3).
Since we are interested in task followers as distinct from occupation followers, for
all of the remaining analyses we will not count an occupational follower as a task follower,
but will instead include a separate occupational follower dummy.
2.5.2 Wage Premium
The results from the wage regression are presented in Table 2.4. In the first column
(No Controls) we report the correlation between wages and following, while the second
column (Basic) includes basic individual level controls. Standard specification (column 3)
adds industry controls and occupation group controls and is the baseline model we will use
in the analyses to follow. Finally, the last column, expanded specification, includes detailed
occupation controls.
When there are no controls for occupations (First two columns - No Controls and
Basic), there is a statistically significant 5-6% wage premium associated with task
following. Occupation followers earn a statistically significant 9-10% wage premium,
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when basic individual characteristics are controlled for. When we control for occupation
groups and industry groups (Standard), there is still a 5% wage premium for task followers,
while the premium associated with occupation followers is reduced to 4%. Finally, when
detailed occupational controls are added in addition to occupation group controls and
industry controls, the wage premium remains at 4.5% for task followers and 4% for
occupational followers. This suggests that task followers, even when working in
occupations that are similar by group and by detailed job requirements, earn a wage
premium over those that are not task followers.
Okumura and Usui find a similar task premium, however, they find this only for
whites. To compare our findings to their results, we do the same analysis as in Table 2.4,
only grouping by race.41 Table 2.5 reports these wage premium estimates by race. While
there does seem to be a negative relationship between wages and both task and occupation
following among African Americans (No Controls), this disappears when occupation and
industry controls are included. The point estimate for African Americans is nearly the same
as for whites, however, it is more imprecisely identified and is not statistically significant.
Occupational following, however, does not seem to have a positive premium associated
with it among African Americans.
To explore the source of the task and the occupational follower premium we next
run the wage regression with interaction terms between an individuals’ education status
and task/occupation following.
For all three samples (pooled, men and women) the coefficient on task following is
insignificant, but a large, positive, statistically significant coefficient is found on the

41

Estimates using Okumura and Usui measure is available upon request.
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interaction between task following and college graduates. Interestingly the occupation
following premium for men is largely unaffected and the interaction between occupation
followers and college graduates is close to zero and statistically insignificant. However, for
women the occupation premium coefficient is very small, but the interaction term is large
(25%) and significant at the 5% level when controlling for occupations (Table 2.6).
These results imply that task following is associated with higher wages primarily
for college graduates and that is true across gender. This could be partly because of changes
in the rewards to specific tasks overtime. If the market returns to skills that are not
associated with college graduates has decreased, then the investments that the fathers with
those skills made in their children are less valuable in the future.
2.6

Discussion

2.6.1 Factors that Determine Task Following
The fact that the wage premium differs across gender and schooling is suggestive
that task and occupation following might also vary along these dimensions. To test for
differences, we perform a logit analysis on the likelihood of being an occupation follower
and an analysis on the likelihood of being a task follower.
Table 2.7 reports the coefficients on gender, race and schooling from the logit
analysis. For both occupation and task following, women are much less likely to be
followers. Education is also associated with being less likely to be a follower. This could
be a function of the higher education attainments of children. However, the interaction
between gender and schooling is positive and significant. That is to say that highly educated
women are much more likely to be task and occupation followers than highly educated
men, controlling for the fact that women in general are less likely to be followers.
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Consistent with the results in Okumura and Usui, African Americans are less likely
to be occupational followers. However, when only looking at task followers, the effect is
small and statistically insignificant.
2.6.2 Time Trend
Given the change in the composition of occupations and the dominant task
associated with each occupation over time, we perform our baseline analysis with
interaction terms between task followers and post 1990 and occupation followers and post
1990. The results of this are presented in Table 2.8.
For men there is little to suggest that the premium associated with task and
occupation following is different. However, for women the premium for occupation
following is large in the post 1990s period, while indistinct from zero previously. This is
likely driven by the increased integration of women in previously male dominated jobs.
2.7

Conclusion
In this paper we document that there is a substantial amount of what we refer to as

task following; that is children who enter into occupations that use similar skills as their
father’s occupation, but are not the same occupation. We find that task following is lower
among women and the higher educated, however it is relatively higher for more educated
women.
Further, in line with previous work on occupational following, task following is
associated with higher wages. The magnitude of the premium is of a similar magnitude as
occupation following when controlling for occupation groups. This premium appears to be
much larger for college graduates. We find no differences in the task premium associated
with race.
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This provides additional evidence that fathers are able to transmit task related skills
to their children and this has benefits in the labor market. While not a direct test of the
nepotism hypothesis for occupational following, this seems to be an unlikely source of the
task following premium. While, fathers may be able to provide opportunities within an
occupation, this seems much less likely to be true across occupations. Although, if fathers’
networks span occupations within a task grouping, then nepotism could still be an
explanation.
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Table 2.1 Intergenerational Task Transition, and Distribution of Tasks for Fathers and Offspring

Table 2.2 Intergenerational Task Transition, Share Conditional on Father’s Task
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Table 2.3 Intergenerational Task Transition for Non-Occupation Followers
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Table 2.4 Father Followers’ Premium, GSS 1972-2010
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Table 2.5 Father Task Follower’s Premium Coefficients by Race, GSS 1972-2010
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Table 2.6 Wage Premium for Father Followers, Role of Education
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Table 2.7 Probability of Being a Father Follower

74

Table 2.8 Wage Premium for Father Followers over Time
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CHAPTER 3
FATHER COMPETITION: THE CAREER EFFECTS OF HAVING A
CADRE PARENT
3.1

Introduction
Recently, a new slang term Pin Die (father competition), has become popular in

China. Pin Die refers to the idea that the success of an individual depends more on his or
her parents' economic, political and social advantages than on one’s own efforts. There are
concerns that “father competition” will result in strong intergenerational income
persistence and make it harder for people from less privileged families to succeed, which
has been a major source of income inequality during China's transition from a central
planned economy to a market-driven one (Meng, 2004, 2007; Whyte, 2012; Knight, 2014).
This social phenomenon has triggered a surge of literature investigating whether and how
parents' education, income, and occupations affect their offspring’s education, health and
earnings (Lam and Schoeni, 1993; Wang, 2005; Li, 2006; Yao and Zhao, 2006; Li, Liu,
Zhang and Ma, 2007; Chen and Cowell, 2013; Eriksson, Pan and Qin, 2014) 42.
Cadres, defined as people in administrative positions in governments and pseudogovernment organizations (e.g. state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public organizations),
are among the privileged in China. Viewed as “the political elite” (Lee 1991, p.5), cadres
are “distinguished from the masses by their power and authority” (Barnett and Vogel 1967,

42

Literature has also well documented the intergenerational income persistence in the developed countries,
which will not be discussed in details in this article. For details, please refer to Behrman and Rosenzweig
(2002), Corak (2013), Solon (2002, 2004), Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007), Lefgren, Sims, and Lindquist
(2012).

76

p.39). 43 Cadre parents and their offspring have received wide attention in the public
discussion of “father competition” but are much less discussed in the literature of
intergenerational correlations in socio-economic attainment.
Research has pointed out that political privilege affects individuals’ own business
profits (Choi and Zhou, 2001; Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2007;
Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008; Xiong and Shan, 2013) and wage earnings (Nee, 1989,
1991, 1996; Bian and Logan, 1996; Gerber, 2000; Morduch and Sicular, 2000; Liu, 2003;
Apleton, Knight, Song and Xia 2009; Yang, Wang and Liu, 2010; Zhang, Giles and Rozelle,
2012). Given this, one may expect cadre parents to affect their offspring's labor market
outcomes through several possible transmission channels (Lin and Bian, 1991; Bian, 2002;
Meng, 2007). First, cadre parents are the elites of a society, who may pass better genetic
inheritance on to their children and make greater and more efficient human capital
investments (Broaded and Liu, 1996). Second, because they have close political
connections with government, cadre parents may enlarge the size and improve the quality
of their offspring's social networks, leading to better career opportunities and higher
earnings (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Yang, Wang and Liu, 2010; Jia, Lan and
GSB, 2013). Third, given that rent-seeking firms tend to approach powerful government
officials to get more resources and business opportunities, cadre parents may ensure higher

43

The concept of cadre in China change substantially over years, which grew from “the leaders of masses”
in revolutionary contexts to “the political elite and the functionaries staffing the huge party-state apparatus.”
(Lee 1991, 5.). In the contemporary concept, cadres are not necessarily CCP members, and CCP members
are not all cadres. Cadres in government are considered as “leaders”, different from the ordinary civil servants
who are “being led". Moreover, managerial status in SOEs are counted as cadres since they were once covered
by the same personnel management system as government officials. Even after decades of reform, they still
share some special political linkages to government officials. Usually, a person with an administrative
position in SOEs can move parallel to positions of the same level in government agencies. (See
http://countrystudies.us/china/113.htm,2/23/14 7:23pm).
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earnings for children in specific firms that are closely related to government networks (Fan,
2002; Cheung, Jing, Rau, and Stouraitis 2005).
Two recent studies in China have attempted to explore whether individuals benefit
from cadre parents. First, Jia et al. (2013) suggest that individuals with cadre parents are
more likely to become entrepreneurs. With respect to labor market outcomes, Li et al. (2012)
provide evidence that college graduates do benefit from cadre parents in terms of higher
starting wages. This study includes many control variables of family background and
individual characteristics (e.g. college entrance exam scores, college activities and college
human capital attributes). However, using data from a college-based survey, only broad
measurements of occupation-related characteristics (i.e. job location, industry, and firms'
ownership types) are included in the analysis. These control variables capture the
differences in individual tastes and labor quality, while the cadre parent effects can be
correlated with differences in occupations and social networks between individuals with
and without cadre parents. For example, if having a cadre parent is associated with betterpaid job features, more valuable social networks and higher wages, the previously
estimated cadre parent wage premium could be biased upward. Therefore, it is necessary
to include measurements of detailed job characteristics and social networks to capture the
differences in job characteristics, social networks and even some of the unobserved skill
endowments.
This study empirically explores whether cadre parents improve their offspring’s
labor market outcomes, in terms of wages and promotion prospects. Taking advantage of
rich information on occupation-related characteristics and social networks in the data from
China General Social Survey (CGSS 2006), the goal of this study is to examine whether

78

the cadre parent premium reported in previous literature is real or whether it just reflects
the differences in occupation-related characteristics and social networks that are associated
with having a cadre parent. If the latter, the issue then turns to why cadre parents are
associated with job characteristics and social networks that lead to better labor market
outcomes and what policies can be put in place to ensure equal opportunities for individuals
from less privileged families in China.
The empirical findings contribute to the current literature in the following manners.
First, this study documents a positive relationship between cadre parents and their
offspring’s promotion prospects, which has not been discussed in previous literature.
Empirically, the evidence shows that individuals with cadre parents are more likely to be
promoted in terms of both position and wage promotions. The effects are independent of
individual and parental characteristics, as well as a rich set of job characteristics. Second,
the cadre-parent wage premium is around 10% at the mean level, independent of individual,
parental characteristics, which is consistent with findings in Li et al. (2012). However, for
offspring in the above-median income group, around 30-50% of the observed cadre parent
premium can be explained by detailed job characteristics. This implies that this group of
individuals with cadre parents earn higher wages because they end up doing different jobs
compared to those without cadre parents. Moreover, this study, incorporates measures of
social networks and empirically shows that cadre parents contribute to valuable social
networks that offspring can lean on as their career develops. Specifically, evidence
suggests that around 50% of the cadre parent premium at the mean level can be explained
by individual’s closer relations with government officials, managers and people from the
publicly owned enterprises. This finding suggests that the previously observed cadre parent
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wage premium are biased upward. However, the cadre parent effects on one’s promotion
prospects remain robust after controlling for social network differences, implying that
having a cadre parent is a type of social capital that individuals can lean on as their careers
develop.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the data,
variable measurements and summary statistics of related variables. Section 3.3 introduces
the econometric model and methods used in this study. Section 3.4 provides the major
empirical results and Section 3.5 discusses possible explanations of the cadre-parent
premium. Section 3.6 summarizes conclusions and discusses the results.
3.2

Data and Statistics Description
The data used in this research is from China General Social Survey (CGSS) (2006).

Started in 2003, CGSS is the first continuous national social survey project in mainland
China, which is jointly carried out by Renmin University of China and University of Hong
Kong Science and Technology. The CGSS (2006) data covers 28 out of 31 provinces,
municipalities, and autonomous regions (not including Qinghai, Xinjiang and Tibet). The
data set contains a rich set of information on individuals' characteristics, their parents'
personal characteristics (education, income, and employment status, etc.), China
Communist Party (CCP) membership and cadre status. Parents' information is surveyed
regardless of whether they live with their children. This helps to avoid any co-inhabitant
selection bias.
We restrict our sample to working-age individuals (18-59 for men and 18-55 for
women) with urban Hukou (urban household registration identity). We focus on
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respondents with full-time working status who work more than 30 hours per week. 44
Altogether there are 1,983 individuals in the sample and 879 with valid information on
wages and major individual/parental characteristics. Wage is defined to include the
regular wages, bonus, allowances, subsidies, welfare payments, and other wage income.
The analysis of cadre parent wage effects is based on the monthly wage earnings from the
survey for the month before the interview in 2005. 45 Table 3.1 reports the summary
statistics of major variables for all individuals, as well as for individuals with and without
a cadre parent, respectively. In our sample, 20 % of individuals have at least one cadre
parent, 17 % have only a cadre father, and 5% have only a cadre mother. Individuals with
a cadre parent have had higher rates of position and wage promotion in the past three years.
They also have had higher average monthly/hourly earnings compared to those without
cadre parents; this wage difference equals around 300 CNY. The two groups exhibit few
differences in average years of education, gender distribution, proportion of CCP
members and occupation/industry distribution. Appendix E provides how these variables
are measured.
Table 3.2 provides a sketch of how cadre parents affect the income distribution of
the next generation, using the intergenerational income transmission matrices for the noncadre parent group and the cadre parent group, respectively. The percentage in each cell

44

Only 40 % of full-time workers in our sample reported weekly working hours of 40-44 hours, which is
the legal weekly working hour in China. Nearly 30 % of these workers reported working more than 50 hours
per week. This may reflect measurement errors in this self-reported working hours, and related variables.
Here we restrict our sample to those work more than 30 hours per week to ensure an adequate sample size
with reasonable working hours.
45
The hourly wage rates are also calculated based on monthly wages, using self-reported weekly working
hours. The analysis of cadre parent wage effects in this study is carried out twice, using the monthly wage
and the hourly wage rate respectively. The results are similar between estimations based on monthly wages
and those based on hourly wages. However, hourly wage is noisier than monthly wage given the possible
measurement errors with the self-reported weekly working hours. Therefore, we focus on monthly wage as
our preferred dependent variable and interpret our findings based on this variable.
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denotes the proportion of offspring in each income quantile, depending on the income
quantiles of their fathers. These can be interpreted as the possibility of an individual's
earnings falling into quantile i conditioned on their fathers’ earnings falling into quantile j.
Absolute value of t-statistics reports whether the probabilities differ significantly between
cadre-parent group and non-cadre parent group.
The transmission matrices reveal that having a cadre parent appears to have the
following effects on the intergenerational income transmission. First, it promotes the
upward income mobility for low income groups. For fathers in the bottom income group
(1st quantile), the probability of their offspring reaching the second highest income group
(4th quantile) is only 14% for the non-cadre parent group and is 40% for the cadre parent
group. It appears that having a cadre parents helps individuals reach a higher income
stratum, and it serves as a driving force to facilitate upward income mobility. Second, it
consolidates the income persistence in the high-income strata. For fathers in the top
income group (5th quantile), the probability of their offspring falling into the 2 nd -quantile
income group is 16% for non-cadre parent group, and is 6% for cadre parent group; the
probabilities of their offspring falling into the 1st-quantile income group is 14% for noncadre parent group, and is only 6% for cadre parent group. For fathers in the top income
group, the probability that their offspring remain in the same income group is similar
(around 38%) for both non-cadre parent and cadre parent groups. This transmission matrix
reveals that there seems to be some economic benefits associated with having a cadre
parent, which places the second generation of cadres at the center of the “father
competition” discussion.

82

3.3

Empirical Models

3.3.1 Wage
This study uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors
to see whether having at least one cadre parent will significantly increase an individual's
income at the mean level. The specified empirical model is shown as follows:
𝑙𝑛𝑤 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚 + 𝛽 𝑋 + 𝛽 𝑌 + 𝛽 𝑍 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜖

(1)

In the above specification, the dependent variable is the natural log of an
individual's monthly wage income. 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if at least one
of individual i's parents is a cadre. 𝛽 captures the cadre-parent effects on offspring's wages.
𝑋 is a vector of the worker's demographic and human capital characteristics, such as
gender, age, education, experience, experience-squared, CCP membership and cadre status
etc. 𝑌 is a vector of parental characteristics, including parents' political status (CCP
member identifier dummy), fathers' annual income and parents' education. 𝑍 is a vector of
individual’s occupational-related characteristics, including occupational/industrial groups,
enterprise ownership, as well as a set of detailed occupational characteristics 46. 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
is a set of control variables for regional variation. If the cadre parent premium is highly
correlated with individual/parental/occupational characteristics, the inclusion of 𝑋 , 𝑌 and
𝑍 may render the coefficient of 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚 insignificant.

46

These detailed occupational characteristics include whether training is required and how much time needed
to acquire skills at work; whether respondents have taken on-the-job training; whether the work is repetitive;
whether individuals are aware of the tasks; whether the work requires following standard rules, long time
work, heavy workload, frequent movement, quick thinking and response; whether the working environment
is clean and tidy; whether the wage determination is related to performance.
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3.2 Promotion
With respect to the cadre-parent effects on promotion, the empirical specification
follows the theoretical framework in Cobb-Clark (2001). The probability that a worker i
gets promoted is determined as a function of index Y (the index of promotability in CobbClark 2001), which is modeled as:
𝑌 = 𝜃 + 𝜃 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚 + 𝜃 𝑋 + 𝜃 𝑌 + 𝜃 𝑍 + 𝜃 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜂

(2)

In the above specification, 𝑌 equals to one if an individual has received either
position or wage promotions in the past three years. This treatment of promotion is similar
to Cobb-Clark and Dunlop (1999), Cobb-Clark (2001), and Addison, Ozturk and Wang
(2014). 𝜃 captures the influence of parents' cadre status on their offspring's promotion
prospects. 𝑋 ,𝑌 and 𝑍 are vectors of individual, parental and occupational characteristics
as in specification (1). Specification (2) specification is estimated using a probit model.
3.3 Wage premium by income groups
The OLS regression focuses only on the mean-level income effects of having a
cadre parent. It fails to look into the economic effect of having a cadre parent on different
income groups. The quantile regression model is more flexible than the OLS regression in
that it allows for studying the effects of covariates on the whole distribution of the income
groups. Let 𝑄 (𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 |𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚 ) 𝜆 ∈ (0,1) denote the 𝜆

th

quantile of the natural

logarithm monthly income of an individual i for explanatory variables, 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚 . We model
these conditional quantiles by:
𝑄 (𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 |𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚 ) = 𝐺 𝛾(𝜆) + 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑚 𝛼(𝜆) + 𝛿
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(3),

where 𝛼(𝜆) is a vector of quantile coefficients for “cadre parent” dummy; 𝐺 is a
vector of control variables, including 𝑋 ,𝑌 and 𝑍 as defined in specification (1); 𝛾(𝜆) is
a vector of quantile coefficients of the control variables.
3.4

Empirical Results

3.4.1 Cadre-parent Premiums
(1) Wage
Table 3.3 shows the robust OLS regression results for the average working-age
population. Panel A reports the wage effects of having at least one cadre parent. Panel B
estimates whether the cadre parent premium mainly comes from mother or father, and
whether the premium will be enhanced when both parents are cadres. In panel A, column
1 reports the estimated coefficient of β with no other control variables. For individuals
with a cadre parent, we expect to see about 21.3% higher average wages. After controlling
for parents’ characteristics (i.e. fathers’ yearly income, parents’ CCP membership, parents’
education) and individual characteristics (i.e. gender, years of schooling, experience,
experience-squared, CCP member, cadre status, firms' ownership structures and economic
regions), the cadre-parent wage premium is still significant at 5% level, with the magnitude
shrinking to 9.3% (Column 2, “Basic” specification). Considering that the cadre parent
wage premium may capture the ability differences of workers that sort into different
industrial/occupational categories, dummies of occupational/ industrial groups are added
to the regression (Column 3, “Standard” specification). The cadre parent premium is still
significant and the magnitude does not change much (8.8%). These results are consistent
with what is found in Li et, al (2012).
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In Panel B, we replace the cadre-parent dummy in panel A with three dummies:
cadre father, cadre mother, and cadre mother interacts with cadre father 47. Similar as in
panel A, the first column in panel B reports the estimation with no other control variables,
the second column adds controls for individual and parents’ characteristics, and the third
controls for occupational/industrial groups. Comparing to individuals with no cadre parent,
those with only a cadre father enjoy significantly higher average wages. The premium
associated with having only a cadre mother shows marginal significance when control
variables are added to regression. The magnitude of having only cadre mothers, when
significant, is higher than the magnitude of having only cadre fathers. However, the
interaction term of cadre-mother and cadre-father dummies is not significant, indicating
that the wage premium when both parents are cadres is not significantly higher than the
case of having only a cadre father. This implies that the number of cadre parents makes
little difference.
Table 3.4 reports how the explanatory power of cadre parent premium changes
across alternative specifications, and across the conditional distribution of offspring’s wage
earnings. Column (1) reports the cadre parent wage premium based on the robust OLS
regression, and Columns (2)- (6) report the estimated cadre parent premium across
offspring’s income quantile groups based on quantile regressions. After controlling for
individual characteristics (Row 2), the cadre parent premium observed in “No control”
specification shrinks substantially across the income distribution. Particularly for those in
90-percentile income group, the cadre-parent effect shrinks from 28.5% to 4.9% and
become insignificant. This implies that for individuals at the top of income distribution,

47

For those whose parents are both cadres, all the three dummies, cadre father, cadre mother and cadre father*
cadre mother equal to one.
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the observed cadre parent premium can be largely explained by differences in individual’s
characteristics.
Adding controls for parents’ characteristics and occupational/industrial groups
affects the cadre parent premium very little for individuals below the top income groups.
The cadre parent premium remains significant with the magnitudes between 9%-10% (Row
3 and Row 4). Comparing Row 5 and Row 6, we see that adding the occupational training
requirements are the most influential to the cadre parent premium for offspring in the
above-medium wage groups. The estimated coefficients on cadre parent premium are
insignificant, with the magnitude shrinking from 9.8% to 6.6% in the 75-percentile wage
group and from 2.3% to -0.6% in the 90-perentile wage group. When adding detailed
occupational characteristics, the estimated coefficients of the cadre parent premium
become insignificant for individuals at the bottom and the median income groups. However,
at the mean level, the cadre parent premium remains positive and significant even after
controlling for a rich set of occupational characteristics.
In summary, empirical evidence in this section indicates that a cadre parent
contributes to around a 10% wage premium at the mean level, which remains significant
when individual/parental/occupational characteristics are controlled for. The premium is
more prominent for offspring at the below-median wage distribution than for those at the
above-median wage distribution. For offspring at the above-median wage distribution,
much of the cadre parent premium can be explained by the differences in
individual/occupational characteristics. This implies that for individuals at the abovemedian income groups, the observed cadre parent premium does not come from their
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father’s special social status per se, but comes from their superior ability and higher returns
associated with their job characteristics.
(2) Promotion Prospects
Table 3.5 reports the effects of cadre parents on offspring’s promotion prospects.
The first two columns report the estimated coefficients and marginal effects on positionrank promotions, and the last two columns show estimations on wage-rank promotions.
The cadre parent effects are estimated and reported across various specifications as defined
in the previous section. Notice that having a cadre parent contributes to higher average
probability of position-rank promotion (5.5%-7.8%) and wage-rank promotion (5.8%10.4%). The effects are independent of the observable individual/parental/occupational
characteristics.
3.5

Discussion of Transmission Mechanisms
The above analysis shows that the cadre parent premium exists in terms of better

promotion prospects and higher wage earnings. One is then left to explain why the cadreparent premium exists and how it is transmitted to the second generation. In this section,
we explore possible mechanisms through which cadre parents transfer their advantages to
offspring. This section explores two mechanisms that may contribute to the observed cadreparent premium.
3.5.1 Social Networks
One possible mechanism that may lead to the cadre-parent premium is social
networks. It is possible that individuals with a cadre parent have larger and better qualities
of social networks compared to those without a cadre parent (Knight and Yueh 2008). This
mechanism, however, has not been examined in previous literature due to data restrictions.
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This subsection explores whether and how social networks serve as a channel that transmit
cadre parent premium from one generation to the next.
In this study, the characteristics of “Spring Festival network” are used as proxies
for offspring’s social networks. The Spring Festival is the most important traditional
festival in China for family reunions and social visits. The “Spring Festival network” has
been used by many studies as a measurement of social networks in China (Bian and Li
2000; Jia et al. 2013; Zhao 2002; Zhao 2013). CGSS2006 contains rich information on
Spring Festival visitors, including the size of the social network (total number of
family/non-family member visitors), the composition of social network (visitors’
occupation, the ownership structures of visitors’ enterprises). Visitors’ occupations are
categorized into three groups: 1) peasants and ordinary workers, including peasants,
peasant workers, industrial workers, business and service workers, baby sitters and hourly
workers; 2) professionals and technicians, including researchers, college professors,
teachers, technicians and engineers, doctors and nurses, commercial and sales persons,
lawyers and other legal service providers, private business owners; 3) cadres and managers,
including government officials, CCP administrators, and managers in enterprises. Visitors’
enterprises are grouped, in terms of ownership structure, into public-owned, privately
owned, foreign invested enterprises and other enterprises.
The summary statistics of social network measurements are presented in Table 3.6.
Compared to offspring without a cadre parent, those with a cadre parent have more nonfamily member visitors, greater proportion of visitors being professionals/ technicians and
government official/enterprises managers, and a greater proportion of visitors from publicowned enterprises.
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We then control for a broad range of variables 48 to see whether the social network
characteristics differ significantly between offspring with a cadre parent and those without
a cadre parent, the results of which are reported in Table 3.7.
The first two columns in Table 3.7 reports the Poisson regression results of the
cadre parent effect on the number of family/non-family visitors, respectively. 49 Offspring
with cadre parents have, on average, 6.8% more family member visitors and 9.8% more
non-family member visitors in the Spring Festival, compared to those without a cadre
parent. These suggest that cadre parents are associated with a larger size of social networks
within and beyond the family. Columns (3) - (5) report whether visitors’ occupation differ
significantly between those with and without a cadre parent. The estimations are obtained
based on probit models with robust standard errors. The estimations reveal that individuals
with a cadre parent are more likely to have visitors being government officials/managers.
Columns (6) - (8) present whether the ownership structures of visitors’ enterprises differ
much between those with a cadre parent and those without. The results show that
individuals with a cadre parent are more likely to have visitors from public-owned
enterprises and less likely to have visitors from privately-owned enterprises, compared to
those without a cadre parent. To summarize, individuals with a cadre parent have larger
social network and closer relations with government officials, managers and people from
the public-owned enterprises, which are independent of individual/parental and
occupational characteristics.

48

In all eight specifications, the control variables include: fathers' income in 2005, parents' CCP membership,
parents' educational level, individuals' education, CCP membership, cadre status, marital status, working
experience and its quadratic form, enterprise ownership, as well as provincial dummies.
49
We also ran zero inflated Poisson regression for the same specifications, and the results are similar to what
are presented here.
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To further explore whether cadre-parent premium is associated with social
networks, Table 3.8 presents the OLS regression results adding individuals' social network
measurements to the “standard” specification. In addition to controls in the “standard”
specification, column (1) adds controls for the number of family and non-family member
visitors. Column (2) adds only controls for visitors’ occupations aside of the controls in the
“standard” specification. Column (3) only adds controls for the ownership structures of
visitors’ enterprises. Column (4) includes all the controls in column (1) and adds controls
for visitors’ occupations. Column (5) includes all the controls regarding to the number,
occupation and enterprise ownership of visitors. The estimated cadre parent premium in
columns (1), (2) and (4) barely change compared to the estimation in the “standard”
specification. When the ownership structures of visitors’ enterprises are controlled for in
Columns (3) and (5), the estimated cadre parent premium shrinks from 9.5% (significant
at 5% level) to 7.2% and becomes insignificant. When all the social network variables are
included in the regression, the cadre-parent coefficient at the mean level further shrinks to
5.9% and becomes insignificant.
It is notable that among the social network measurements, the ownership structures
of visitors’ enterprises are the most important influence regarding the cadre parent
premium. Literature suggests that there exist rent-seeking activities between government
and enterprises (see Choi and Zhou 2001, Jia et al. 2013), especially the public-owned
enterprises (POEs)50 (Cheung, Jin, Rau, and Stouraitis 2005). It is possible that POEs may
pay the offspring of cadres with higher wages to “buy" the networks of their parents. With

50

In our study, POEs include both collectively owned enterprise and state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
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closer social networks within the public sectors (government and pseudo-government
organizations), cadre parents have greater chance to affect their offspring's wages in POEs.
Considering that individuals with cadre parents have greater proportion of Spring Festival
visitors in public-owned enterprises, we have reason to believe that cadre parent wage
premium is associated with the social networks within the system of public-owned
enterprises.
However, social networks do not explain cadre-parent effects on individuals’
promotion prospects (Table 3.9). After controlling for a set of social network variables,
cadre-parent effects on promotion remain significant and somewhat constant across various
specifications. The position promotion probability is 6% higher, the wage promotion
probability 9% higher, for individuals with a cadre parent, compared to those without a
cadre parent.
The above analysis reveals that cadre parent wage premium can be somewhat
explained by social networks within the system of public-owned enterprises. However,
social networks barely affect the cadre parent effects on promotion.
3.5.2 Quality of Human Capital
In the standard regression model, individuals' years of education have been
controlled for, which means the cadre-parent premium does not come from offspring's
longer years of schooling. However, there are reasons why years of schooling might not
reflect all the differences in offspring's human capital. These reasons include the effects of
the one-child policy and the low cost in public education in China. The one-child policy
restricts families in the cities to have only one child. Thus, parents tend to concentrate their
investment on the only child so that the child will become better economic providers in
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their parents' old age. At the same time, the 9-year compulsory education programs secure
the chance for every child in the urban area to obtain at least junior-high school education.
The tuition in high-school, colleges and universities are affordable even for children in
non-cadre families to obtain better education. These policies narrow the differences in
years of schooling for individuals in cadre-families and non-cadre families. However, these
institutions do not rule out the possibility that children of cadres may be more likely to
enter better schools, or are equipped with skills that have higher return in the labor market.
51

If evidence were found in favor of this transmission path, the policy implication may be

balancing the pre-labor market differences of individuals from different family
backgrounds by supporting children from the less privileged families. In this part, we
examine whether having a cadre parent is associated with better school choices, longer
years of education, as well as better English skills. The estimations are reported in Table
3.10.
Columns 1-3 in Table 3.10 report logit regression results examining whether
individuals having a cadre parent have greater probabilities of going to better schools.
Better schools refer to “key schools", which are products of the centrally planned economy
in socialist China. Due to scarce educational resources in planned economy, some
educational institutions were selected as “key schools", which were given priority in
getting better teachers, equipment’s, and funds from the central government. In the posttransition period, these key schools remain as the best schools within their regions. Key

51

Even though the cadre parent variable is measured when individuals are adults, it is likely that cadre parents’
have higher abilities and better human capital investment strategies. It follows that their children are more
likely to be equipped with higher than average abilities and are more likely to be admitted by top schools.
Therefore, here we assume that cadre-parents have effects on human capital qualities of their sons and
daughters.
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schools only admit top students, and students enrolled are better trained so as they are more
likely to be admitted by top schools at the next level (Tsang 2003). Having a cadre parent
does not have a significant influence on the probability of entering better elementary
schools, better junior middle schools, or better high schools. Column 4 reports ordered logit
regression results on whether having a cadre parent will significantly affect individuals'
English skills, an important skill that ensures individuals a good job (Pan and Block 2011).
The result shows that no significant effect is found to support the argument that children
having a cadre parent have better English skills. Column 5 shows that having a cadre parent
does not lead to longer years of schooling for offspring. These indicate that having a cadre
parent does not lead to better school choices, better English skills, or higher educational
attainment. Hence, the cadre-parent-premium does not come from the observable quality
differences in the offspring's human capital.
3.6

Conclusions
During China’s transition from a central planned economy to a market driven one,

there’s a heated debate on whether the second generation of cadres can benefit from their
privileged parents in terms of labor market outcomes. Despite the existence of evidence
indicating that having a cadre parent benefits offspring’s career outcome, previous
literature does not account for differences in detailed job characteristics and social
networks among workers, which may confound causal inference of cadre parent premium.
This study empirically explores whether the cadre parent career effects are due to
parents’ privileged status per se, or it reflects differences in skills, occupations, and social
networks between individuals with and without cadre parents. It contributes to the existing
literature from the following aspects. First, in addition to the wage premium, this study also
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looks into how cadre parents affect individual’s promotion prospects that has not been
covered in previous research. Second, incorporating a rich set of detailed job characteristics,
the estimation captures wage effects due to differences in labor quality, tastes and job
attributes that are not controlled for in previous China-based studies. Third, this study
incorporates social networks as a transmission mechanism of cadre-parent premium, which
has not been discussed in this line of work.
Empirically, this study highlights the following findings. First, a cadre parent does
lead to better promotion prospects for offspring. We find that having a cadre parent is
associated with around 6% of higher rate of position promotions and around 8% of higher
rate of wage promotions. This effect is independent of individual/parental and detailed
occupation-related characteristics.
Second, the cadre parent wage premium is around 10% at the mean level, which is
independent

of

individual

and

parental

characteristics.

Detailed

occupational

characteristics explain most of the cadre parent premium for individuals in the abovemedian income groups, which implies that these individuals benefit from cadre parents
mainly from obtaining occupations that yield higher returns in labor market. The cadre
parent premium at the mean level, however, cannot be explained away when detailed
occupational characteristics are controlled for.
Further exploration reveals that cadre parent premium does not come from human
capital quality differences, but is associated with an individual’s social network differences.
Evidence shows that individuals with cadre parents have larger size of social networks
within and beyond families. They also have closer relations with government officials,
managers and people from public-owned enterprises. When social network measurements
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are controlled for, the mean-level cadre parent premium shrinks and becomes statistically
insignificant. This reveals that the cadre parent wage premium documented in previous
literature could be biased upward. One possible mechanism through which cadre parent
premium is transmitted across generations: social networks. One interpretation may be that
individuals with a cadre parent are endowed with some unobserved social skills that help
them build up valuable social networks, which brings about higher labor market returns.
Another interpretation is that cadre parents’ privileges enable their children’s access to
valuable social networks, which are not available for individuals without a cadre parent. It
is this social network difference that leads to the observed cadre-parent wage premium.
Whichever interpretation is valid, having a cadre parent does serve as a type of social
capital that individuals can lean on as their career develops.

96

Table 3.1A Summary Statistics of Major Variables for Chapter 3
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Table 3.1B Summary Statistics of Major Variables for Chapter 3
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Table 3.2 Income Transmission Matrices, Cadre Parent Group vs. Non-Cadre Parent Group
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Table 3.3 Cadre-parent Premium: Results from OLS Regression
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Table 3.4 Cadre-parent Coefficient Sensitivity to Specifications
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Table 3.5 Cadre-parent Effects: Promotion
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Table 3.6 Descriptive Summaries of Spring Festival Visitors
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Non Cadre Parent Cadre Parent
Total Number of Visitors
28.32
30.88
Number of Family Visitors
14.11
14.28
Number of non-Family Visitors
14.21
16.61
Visitors: Public-Owned Enterprises
0.27
0.37
Visitors: Privately Owned Enterprises
0.39
0.30
Visitors: Foreign Invested Enterprises
0.05
0.10
Visitors: Other Ownership
0.26
0.20
Visitors: Peasants or Workers
0.91
0.90
Visitors: Professionals and Technicians
0.66
0.74
Visitors: Governement Officials and Enterprise Managers
0.27
0.43
Note: The statistics are calculated using the svy command in Stata 14.

|t|-stat
1.44
0.19
1.93
2.79
2.69
2.41
1.64
0.58
2.82
4.26

Table 3.7 Cadre Parent Effects on Offspring’s Social Networks
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Table 3.8 Cadre-parent Wage Effects, Controlling for Social Network Measurements
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Table 3.9 Cadre-parent Promotion Effects, Controlling for Social Network Measurements
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Table 3.10 Cadre Parent and Human Capital Quality Differences
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS FOR CHAPTER 1
[Proof of Proposition 1]
In the starting wage contracts from type 𝑗 supervisor to type 𝑖 workers as follows:
𝑤,

,

=𝜃

= 𝜃𝑢 ,
𝜌

,

+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑢 ,

𝑢,

,

+𝜖

,

+ 1− 𝜌

𝑚 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢 ,

,

In this wage contract, the weight that type 𝑗 supervisor put on type 𝑖 worker’s true
productivity is
θ 𝜌

+1−𝜃

In predominantly male occupations (𝑝 < 0.5), 𝑝 < (1 − 𝑝 ) , we have 𝜌

>

𝜌 , implying that male supervisors put more weight on workers’ signal and less weight
on workers’ group average productivity, compared to female supervisors. In predominantly
female occupations (𝑝 > 0.5), 𝑝 > 1 − 𝑝

, we have 𝜌

> 𝜌 , implying that female

supervisors put more weight on workers’ signal and less weight on workers’ group average
productivity, compared to male supervisors.
For workers with skill attainments A , the average extent of skill mismatch if
working with a female supervisor is: 𝐸(𝑄 , ) = 1 − (𝜌 ) |𝑚 − A |. The average extent
of skill mismatch if working with a male supervisor is: 𝐸(𝑄 , ) = [1 − (𝜌 ) ]|𝑚 − A |.
In predominantly male occupations, 𝜌 ,

> 𝜌,
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, we have 𝐸(𝑄 , ) > 𝐸(𝑄 , ). In

predominantly female occupations ( 𝑝 > 0.5) , 𝑝 > 1 − 𝑝

, we have 𝐸(𝑄 , ) <

𝐸(𝑄 , ).
End of Proof.
[Proof of Proposition 2]
The average starting wage for female workers with female supervisors in
predominantly female occupation is
𝐸 𝑤
= E{𝜃

𝜌

𝑢

+𝜖

, ,

= 𝜃𝑢

, ,

,

, ,

+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

+ 1− 𝜌

, ,

𝑚 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

, ,

} =m

The average wages for male workers with male supervisors in predominantly
female occupation is
𝐸 𝑤
=𝐸

𝜌

𝑢

, ,

= θ𝑢

, ,

+𝜖

,

, ,

+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

+ 1− 𝜌

, ,

𝑚 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

, ,

=m

The average wages for male workers with female supervisors in predominantly
female occupation is
𝐸 𝑤
= E{𝜃

𝜌

𝑢

, ,

= 𝜃𝑢

, ,

+𝜖

,

, ,

+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

+ 1− 𝜌

, ,

𝑚 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

, ,

} =m

The average wages for female workers with male supervisors in predominantly
female occupation is
𝐸 𝑤
=𝐸

𝜌

𝑢

, ,

= θ𝑢

, ,

+𝜖

,

, ,

+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

+ 1− 𝜌
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, ,

𝑚 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

, ,

=m

The average wages for male workers with female supervisors in predominantly
male occupation is
𝐸 𝑤
= E{𝜃

𝜌

𝑢

, ,

= 𝜃𝑢

, ,

+𝜖

,

, ,

+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

+ 1− 𝜌

, ,

𝑚 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

, ,

} =m

The average wages for male workers with male supervisors in predominantly male
occupation is
𝐸 𝑤
= 𝐸 (𝜌 ) 𝑢

, ,

= θ𝑢

, ,

+𝜖

,

, ,

+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

, ,

+ (1 − (𝜌 ) )𝑚 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

, ,

=m

The average wages for female workers with male supervisors in predominantly
male occupation is
𝐸 𝑤
= 𝐸 (𝜌 ) 𝑢

, ,

= θ𝑢

, ,

+𝜖

,

, ,

+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

, ,

+ (1 − (𝜌 ) )𝑚 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

, ,

=m

The average wages for female workers with female supervisors in predominantly
male occupation is
𝐸 𝑤
= E{𝜃

𝜌

𝑢

, ,

= 𝜃𝑢

, ,

+𝜖

,

, ,

+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

+ 1− 𝜌

, ,

𝑚 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑢

, ,

} =m

End of Proof.
[Proof of Proposition 3]
In stage 2, workers’ true productivity is realized, and each of them is paid according
to the realized productivity 𝑢 .
𝑢 = f(A , R ) = 𝑅 − 𝑄 ,
The average wage for workers of type i with female supervisors in occupation k is
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= f(A , R ) = R − 1 − (𝜌 ) |𝑚 − A |

E 𝑢,

The average wage for workers of type i with male supervisors in occupation k is
= f(A , R ) = R − [1 − (𝜌 ) ]|𝑚 − A |

E 𝑢,

The proof of proposition 1 shows that in predominantly male occupations, 𝜌 ,

>

𝜌 , , we have 𝐸(𝑄 , ) > 𝐸(𝑄 , ). In predominantly female occupations (𝑝 > 0.5),
𝑝 > 1−𝑝

, we have 𝐸(𝑄 , ) < 𝐸(𝑄 , ).

Therefore, we have: (1) in predominantly male occupations, E 𝑢 , < E 𝑢 , ; (2)
in predominantly female occupations, E 𝑢 , > E 𝑢 , .
End of Proof.
[Proof of Proposition 4]
In predominantly female occupations, for female stayers,
𝒇

𝝅𝒇 × 𝜽 ×

𝒇

𝟏

𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

+ 𝟏 − 𝝅𝒇 × 𝜽 ×

(𝟏 − 𝝅𝒇 ) × 𝜽 ×

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐

×

𝝅

< 𝝅𝒇 × 𝜽 ×

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )
𝒇

+

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

𝟏

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

}×

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

.

The inter-period wage gains conditioning on staying with a male supervisor is
higher than the gains conditioning on staying with a female supervisor.
For male stayers,
𝒇

𝝅𝒇 × 𝜽 ×

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐
𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )
𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

𝟏

𝒇

+ 𝟏 − 𝝅𝒇 × 𝜽 ×

+ (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒇 ) × 𝜽 ×
126

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

×

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

< {𝝅𝒇 × 𝜽 ×

𝟏

}×

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

.

The inter-period wage gain conditioning on staying with a male supervisor is higher
than the gains conditioning on staying with a female supervisor.
Similarly, in predominantly male occupations, for female stayers,
𝒇

𝝅𝒎 × 𝜽 ×

𝟏 (𝝆𝒎 )𝟐
𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒎 )𝟐

𝟏

𝒇

+ (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒎 ) × 𝜽 ×

𝟏 (𝝆𝒎 )𝟐
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)

×

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐

> 𝝅𝒎 × 𝜽 ×

𝝅

𝟏
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)
𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒎 )𝟐

+ (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒎 ) × 𝜽 ×

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)

}×

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

.

The inter-period wage gains conditioning on staying with a female supervisor is
higher than the gains conditioning on staying with a male supervisor.
For male stayers,
𝒇

𝝅𝒎 × 𝜽 ×

𝟏 (𝝆𝒎 )𝟐
𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒎 )𝟐

𝟏

𝒇

+ (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒎 ) × 𝜽 ×

𝟏 (𝝆𝒎 )𝟐
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)

×

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

> {𝝅𝒎 × 𝜽 ×

𝟏
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)
𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒎 )𝟐

+ (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒎 ) × 𝜽 ×

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)

}×

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

.

The inter-period wage gains conditioning on staying with a female supervisor is
higher than the gains conditioning on staying with a male supervisor.
To sum up, stayers with the same-gender supervisors obtain lower inter-period
wage gains compared to stayers with the opposite-gender supervisors, in occupations with
larger proportion of same-gender workers.
[Proof of Proposition 5]
In predominantly female occupation, the inter-period wage gains for movers with:
(1) female supervisors in both stages:
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𝟐

𝒇

𝐸 𝑤,

−𝑤,

,

,

𝑢,

,

<𝑢,

,

)={

𝜽 𝝆𝒇

𝒇

+ (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐 + 𝟏 − 𝜽
𝟐𝜼𝟐
}×
𝝅
𝒇
𝟏 + (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

𝟏
𝟐

(2) female supervisors in stage 1 and male supervisors in stage 2:
𝟐

𝒇

𝒇

𝒎
𝑬 𝒘𝒊,𝒇,𝟏 − 𝒘𝒎
𝒊,𝒇,𝟐 𝒖𝒊,𝒇,𝟏 < 𝒖 ,𝒇,𝟐 ) = {

[𝜽 𝝆𝒇

𝟐
+ (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 ) + 𝟏 − 𝜽]
𝟐
𝟏 + (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

𝟐𝜼𝟐
}×
𝝅

𝟏
𝟐

(3) male supervisors in stage 1 and female supervisors in stage 2:

𝐸 𝑤,

−𝑤,

,

,

𝑢,

,

<𝑢,

,

⎡ 𝜽 𝝆𝒎
𝒇
)=⎢
⎢
⎣

𝟐

𝒇
+ (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐 + 𝟏 − 𝜽⎤
𝟐𝜼𝟐
⎥×
𝝅
⎥
𝒇
𝟏 + (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐
⎦

𝟏
𝟐

⎡ 𝜽 𝝆𝒎
𝒇
)=⎢
⎢
⎣

𝟐

+ 𝝆𝒎
𝒇

+ 𝟏 − 𝜽⎤
𝟐𝜼𝟐
⎥×
𝝅
⎥
𝟐
𝟏 + (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )
⎦

𝟏
𝟐

(4) male supervisors in both stages:

E 𝑤,

,

−𝑤,

,

𝑢,

<𝑢,

,

,

𝟐

It is easy to show that
𝐸 𝑤,

−𝑤,

,

𝑢,

,

<𝑢,

,

>E 𝑤,
𝐸 𝑤,

,

−𝑤,

,

𝑢,

,

>E 𝑤,

𝒇

𝒎
) > 𝑬 𝒘𝒊,𝒇,𝟏 − 𝒘𝒎
𝒊,𝒇,𝟐 𝒖𝒊,𝒇,𝟏 < 𝒖 ,𝒇,𝟐 )

,

−𝑤,

,

<𝑢,
,

,

𝑢,

,

<𝑢,

,

)>𝐸 𝑤,

−𝑤,

,

𝑢,

,

,

)

,

−𝑤,

<𝑢,

,

,

𝑢,

,

<𝑢,

,

)

)

The inter-period wage gains for movers with supervisors of different gender in
different period depend on θ, the order of which cannot be listed unambiguously.
In predominantly male occupation, the inter-period wage gains for movers with:
(1) female supervisors in both stages:
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𝒇

𝐸 𝑤,

,

−𝑤,

,

𝑢,

,

<𝑢,

,

)={

𝜽 𝝆𝒎

𝟐

𝒇

+ (𝝆𝒎 )𝟐 + 𝟏 − 𝜽
𝒇

𝟏 + (𝝆𝒎 )𝟐

𝟏
𝟐

𝟐𝜼𝟐
}×
𝝅

(2) female supervisors in stage 1 and male supervisors in stage 2:
𝟐

𝒇

𝒇

𝒎
𝑬 𝒘𝒊,𝒎,𝟏 − 𝒘𝒎
𝒊,𝒎,𝟐 𝒖𝒊,𝒎,𝟏 < 𝒖 ,𝒎,𝟐 ) = {

[𝜽 𝝆𝒎

𝟐
+ (𝝆𝒎
𝒎 ) + 𝟏 − 𝜽]
𝟐
𝟏 + (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)

𝟐𝜼𝟐
}×
𝝅

𝟏
𝟐

(3) male supervisors in stage 1 and female supervisors in stage 2:

𝐸 𝑤,

,

−𝑤,

,

𝑢,

,

<𝑢,

,

⎡
⎤
𝒇 𝟐
𝟐
𝜽(𝝆𝒎
𝟐𝜼𝟐
𝒎 ) + (𝝆𝒎 ) + 𝟏 − 𝜽
⎥×
)=⎢
𝝅
⎢
⎥
𝒇 𝟐
𝟏
+
(𝝆
)
𝒎
⎣
⎦

𝟏
𝟐

(4) male supervisors in both stages:

E 𝑤,

,

−𝑤,

,

𝑢,

,

<𝑢,

,

𝟐
𝒎 𝟐
𝜽(𝝆𝒎
𝒎 ) + (𝝆𝒎 ) + 𝟏 − 𝜽

)=

𝟐
𝟏 + (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)

𝟐𝜼𝟐
×
𝝅

𝟏
𝟐

It is easy to show that
E 𝑤,

−𝑤,

,

𝑢,

,

<𝑢,

,

> 𝐸 𝑤,
E 𝑤,

,

−𝑤,

,

𝑢,

,

> 𝐸 𝑤,

𝒇

𝒎
) > 𝑬 𝒘𝒊,𝒎,𝟏 − 𝒘𝒎
𝒊,𝒎,𝟐 𝒖𝒊,𝒎,𝟏 < 𝒖 ,𝒎,𝟐 )

,

−𝑤,

,

<𝑢,
,

,

−𝑤,

𝑢,

,

<𝑢,

,

)> 𝐸 𝑤,
,

𝑢,

,

,

)

,

−𝑤,

<𝑢,

,

,

𝑢,

,

<𝑢,

,

)

)

The inter-period wage gains for movers with supervisors of different gender in
different period depend on θ, the order of which cannot be listed unambiguously.
End of Proof.
[Proof of Proposition 6]
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(1) In predominantly female occupations, the return to one-year labor market
experience for stayers is [

+
(

; the return to one-year labor

]×

)

(

)

market experience for movers with supervisor j is

(

)
(

Since (𝜌 ) < (𝜌 ) , we have

+
(

>

(

)
(

.

×
)

×

)

(

>

)

×
(

)

. Stayers’ one-year labor market experience has higher return

×
)

compared to that of movers’ one-year labor market experience.
In predominantly male occupations, the return to one-year labor market experience for
stayers is [

(

)

+

; the return to one-year labor market experience

]×
(

)

for movers with supervisor j is

(

)
(

.

×
)

Since (𝜌 ) > (𝜌 ) , we have

>

(

)
(

×

(

)

+

×
(

>

)

(

)

×

. Stayers’ one-year labor market experience has higher return

)

compared to that of movers’ one-year labor market experience.
(2) In predominantly female occupations, return to one-year labor market
𝒇 𝟐

experience for female workers moving to work with female supervisors is [

𝝆𝒇

𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐
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]×

𝟏

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

, which is higher than that of female workers who move to work with male

supervisors ([

𝝆𝒎
𝒇

𝟏

𝟐

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

]×

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

). The return to one-year labor market experience for male
𝟏

𝒇 𝟐

workers moving to work with female supervisors is [

𝝆𝒇

𝒇

]×

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

than that of male workers who move to work with male supervisors ([

, which is higher

𝝆𝒎
𝒇

𝟏

𝟐

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

]×

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

).

In predominantly male occupations, return to one-year labor market experience for female
𝒇

workers moving to work with female supervisors is [

𝝆𝒎

𝟏

𝟐
𝒇

]×

𝟏 (𝝆𝒎 )𝟐

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

, which is lower
𝟏

than that of female workers who move to work with male supervisors ([

𝟐
(𝝆𝒎
𝒎)
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)

]×

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

).

The return to one-year labor market experience for male workers moving to work with
𝒇

𝝆𝒎

female supervisors is [

𝟏

𝟐
𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒎 )𝟐

]×

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

, which is lower than that of male workers who
𝟏

move to work with male supervisors ([

𝟐
(𝝆𝒎
𝒎)
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒎)

]×

𝟐𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝝅

).

To sum up, in occupations with larger proportion of same-gender workers, workers
move to same-gender supervisors have higher return to labor market experience. In
occupations with larger proportion of opposite-gender workers, workers move to samegender supervisors have lower return to labor market experience.
End of Proof.
[Proof of Proposition 7]
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In predominantly female occupations, the unconditional expectation of second𝟏 𝝅𝒇

stage wage for female workers with the female supervisors is 𝒎 + [

𝒇

𝜼𝟐 𝟐

]×

𝟐𝝅

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

(𝐦 + [

, which is higher than that of female workers with the male supervisors

𝟐
𝟏 𝝅𝒇 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

This

𝟏

𝝅𝒇

+

+

𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

]×

𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

is

because:

𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝟐𝝅

).

𝒎+

(𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

𝜼𝟐 𝟐

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

×

𝒇

𝟐𝝅

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

𝟏 𝝅𝒇

>𝐦+

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

𝟏

𝒇

𝟏 𝝅𝒇

+

𝝅𝒌 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐
𝒇

+

𝜼𝟐 𝟐

×

𝟐𝝅

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

𝟏

𝒇

𝝅𝒇

+

𝟏

𝒇

𝝅𝒇 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

𝝅𝒇
𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

+

𝟐
(𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

𝟏 𝝅𝒇

= 𝐦+

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

+

𝟏

×

𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝟐𝝅

.

In predominantly female occupations, the unconditional expectation of secondstage wage for male workers with the female supervisors is 𝒎 + [

𝒇

]×

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

(𝒎 + [

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

+

𝟏

𝒇

𝝅𝒇 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

𝟏 𝝅𝒇

𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝟐𝝅

, which is higher than that of male workers with the male supervisors

𝟐
𝟏 𝝅𝒇 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

𝟏

𝝅𝒇

+

𝒇

]×

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝟐𝝅

).

This is because:

𝒎+

𝒎+

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

𝟏 𝝅𝒇
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

𝟏

𝒇

𝟏 𝝅𝒇

+

+

𝝅𝒇 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐
𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

𝝅𝒇
𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

+

×

𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝟐𝝅

𝟏 𝝅𝒇

=𝒎+

𝟐
(𝝆𝒎
,𝒇 )
𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
,𝒇 )

𝟐
𝟏 (𝝆𝒎
𝒇 )

𝟏

×

𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝟐𝝅
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+

𝟏

𝒇

𝝅𝒇
𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆,𝒇 )𝟐

+

(𝝆,𝒇 )𝟐
𝒇

𝟏 (𝝆𝒇 )𝟐

×

𝜼𝟐 𝟐
𝟐𝝅

>

The proposition with respect to predominantly male occupations can be proved in
similar ways.
End of Proof.
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APPENDIX C
LINKING THE ASVAB SCORES TO O*NET KSA COMPOSITE 52 FOR
CHAPTER 1

52

This table is listed in the “The ASVAB Career Exploration Program: Theoretical and Technical
Underpinnings of the Revised Skill Composites and OCCU-Find” (2010, p23-24), which is downloaded from
http://www.asvabprogram.com/downloads/Technical Chapter 2010.pdf. (Final version Feb,2011)
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APPENDIX D
EXAMPLES OF JOBS AND TASKS/SKILLS IN THE WORK
ACTIVITIES FOR CHAPTER 2
Task Measures
Following Autor and Acemoglu (2010), the tasks and skills in the work activities are
defined as follows:
Non-routine cognitive: Analytical
Analyzing data/information
Thinking creatively
Interpreting information for others
Examples of jobs with intensive non-routine cognitive analytical tasks: actuaries,
physicists and astronomers, economists, market researcher and survey researcher
Non-routine cognitive: Interpersonal
Establishing and maintaining personal relationships
Guiding, directing and motivating subordinates
Coaching/Developing others
Examples of jobs with intensive non-routine cognitive interpersonal tasks: clergy and
religious workers, athletes, sports instructors, and officials

135

Routine cognitive
Importance of repeating the same task
Importance of being exact or accurate
Structured v. Unstructured work (reverse)
Examples of jobs with intensive routine cognitive tasks: telephone operators, transportation
ticket and reservation agents, and cashiers
Routine manual
Pace determined by speed of equipment
Controlling machines and processes
Spend time making repetitive motions
Examples of jobs with intensive routine manual tasks: machine operators, winding and
twisting textile/apparel operatives, crane, derrick, winch and hoist operators
Non-routine manual physical
Operating vehicles, mechanized devices, or equipment
Spend time using hands to handle, control or feel objects, tools, or controls
Manual dexterity
Spatial orientation
Examples of jobs with intensive non-routine manual physical tasks: airplane pilots and
navigators, excavating and loading machine operators, millwrights, taxi drivers and
chauffeurs
136

Non-routine manual interpersonal
Performing for or working directly with the public
Provide consultation and advice to others
Examples of jobs with intensive non-routine manual interpersonal tasks: psychologists,
managers of food-serving and lodging establishments, actors, directors and producers
We further utilized Autor and Dorn’s aggregation to group all occupations to the 1-digit
level as follows:
management/professional/technical/financial/sales/public security,
administrative support and retail sales,
low-skill service,
precision production and craft, machine operators, assemblers and inspectors
transportation/construction/mechanics-/mining/agricultural.
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APPENDIX E
VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENTS FOR CHAPTER 3
Table E.1 Definition and Measurements of Major Variables
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Table E.2 Definition and Measurements of Major Variables (cont.)
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Table E.3 Definition and Measurements of Major Variables (cont.)
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